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CURRENT LEGALDEVELOPMENTS
A TightropeWalk between Legality and
Legitimacy: An Analysis of the Israeli
Supreme Court’s Judgment on Targeted
Killing
HELEN KELLER AND MAGDALENA FOROWICZ∗
Abstract
The Israeli ofﬁcial policy of targeted killing has often been a subject of controversy and
criticism. Although still applied by the state of Israel, this cruel practice was recently limited
in a courageous decision handed down by the Israeli Supreme Court. The new restrictions
on targeted killing represent an important step towards its criminalization. Despite this, the
Court’s interpretation of the international humanitarian law requirements is still too broad
and there is a need for more restrictive safeguards. In addition, the current uncertainties of
this ﬁeld of law, replicated in the decision, exacerbate the problem further. Themain difﬁculty,
however, lies in the theoretical assumption that targeted killing is legal. This article proposes
instead to view targeted killing as an exception to the presumption of protection of the civilian
population. The authors review the recent trends in international humanitarian law in order
to assess the impact of the Court’s reasoning. Although this landmark case represents an
important breakthrough, it will certainly not be the last word on targeted killing.
Keywords
direct participation in hostilities; fragmentation of international law; international humanit-
arian law; Israeli Supreme Court; targeted killing
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. The judgment in brief
On 13 December 2006, the Supreme Court of the State of Israel (sitting as the
High Court of Justice) issued its decision in the case of Public Committee Against
Torture in Israel v. the Government of Israel.1 The decision concerned a petition ﬁled on
∗ HelenKeller,Dr. iur., LLM(Bruges), isProfessorofConstitutionalLaw,EuropeanLawandPublic International
Law at the University of Zurich. Magdalena Forowicz, LL M, is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Zurich.
We should like to thank Dr. iur. Nils Melzer, Dr. iur. Ursula Brunner, and Dr. iur. Kati Elmaliah for reviewing
this article.
1. HCJ 769/02, Public Committee against Torture in Israel et al. v. Government of Israel et al., 13
December 2006. The judgment is also available in English at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/
02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf. It has been recently analysed in the following articles: S. Schondorf,
‘The Targeted Killings Judgment: A Preliminary Assessment’, (2007) 5 (2) Journal of International Crim-
inal Justice 301; A. Cohen and Y. Shany, ‘A Development of Modest Proportions: The Application of the
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24 January 2002 by the Public Committee Against Torture in Israel (PCATI) and
the Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment
(LAW) to bring the Israeli policy of targeted killing to an end. Following the Sharm
el-Sheikh Summit, where a ceaseﬁre was agreed between Palestinians and Israelis,
Israel suspended its policy of targeted killing in February 2005. As a result, the
Supreme Court decided to ‘freeze’ the petition submitted. The policy of targeted
killing resumed in June 2005 and the Court re-opened the case on 12 December
2005. A year later, a three-judge panel headed by Chief Justice Aharon Barak ﬁnally
ruled that a limited form of targeted killing is allowed, thereby providing a long-
awaited answer to a highly controversial question.
1.2. The practice of targeted killing
Israel is one of the few states in the world to apply openly an ofﬁcial and deliberate
policy of targeted killing.2 On 4 January 2001, Ehud Barak – then Prime Minister –
was reported saying: ‘If people are shooting at us and killing us – our only choice
is to strike back. A country under terrorist attack must strike back.’3 The former
Deputy DefenceMinister, Ephraim Sneh, announced that ‘If anyone has committed
or is planning to carry out terrorist attacks, he has to be hit. It is effective, precise,
and just’.4 Other similar statements were made by government ofﬁcials, as well
as representatives of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), where it was admitted that a
targeted-killing policy does exist.5 It is estimated that between 29 September 2000
and 28 February 2007, 338 Palestinians died during the course of targeted killings,
of which 210 were targeted and 128 were bystanders.6 It therefore appears that
38 per cent of those killed in total were bystanders, and that only 62 per cent of
themwere accurately targeted. Israel has claimed that these preventive killings are
measures of self-defence, that they are proportional and that they are conducted
against legitimate targets and not against civilians. Nonetheless, these reassurances
did not satisfy everyone. The amplitude of the targeted killings and the likelihood
Principle of Proportionality in Targeted Killings Case’, (2007) 5 (2) Journal of International Criminal Justice
310; O. Ben-Naftali, ‘A Judgment in the Shadow of International Law’, (2007) 5 (2) Journal of International
Criminal Justice 322; W. J. Fenrick, ‘The Targeted Killings Judgment and the Scope of Direct Participation in
Hostilities’, (2007) 5 (2) Journal of International Criminal Justice 332; A. Cassese, ‘On Some Merits of the Is-
raeli Judgment on Targeted Killings’, (2007) 5 (2) Journal of International Criminal Justice 339; O. Ben-Naftali
and K. Michaeli, ‘Public Committee Against Torture in Israel et al. v. Government of Israel’, (2007) 101 (2)
AJIL 459.
2. For further information on the origins of the targeted-killing policy, see O. Ben-Naftali and K. Michaeli,
‘Justiciability: A Critique of the Alleged Non-justiciability of Israel’s Policy of Targeted Killing’, (2003) 1 (2)
Journal of International Criminal Justice 368.
3. A. Eldar, ‘Nay-Sayers SpeakOutwhile SilencedMan Blushes in the Corner’,Ha’aretz, 4 January 2001; Y. Stein,
‘Israel’s Assassination Policy: Extra Judicial Executions’, Position Paper, B’Tselem, Jerusalem, 2001.
4. BBC News, ‘Israel’s Assassination Policy’, 1 August 2001, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_
east/1258187.stm.
5. For further information about these statements, see Stein, supra note 3, at 1–2.
6. B’Tselem, Statistics: Fatalities, available at http://www.btselem.org/English/Statistics/Casualties.asp.
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that civilian lives might be taken in error has brought severe criticism on the part
of the international community7 and academic circles.8
1.3. The function of the Israeli Supreme Court
The Israeli SupremeCourthas twomajor, fundamentallydifferent, functions.Onthe
onehand, it acts as anappellate court and, as such, supervises the twocourts of lower
instance – the district courts and the local courts. On the other hand, it acts as aHigh
Court of Justice, supervising the compatibility of governmental or legislatory acts
with constitutional rights. As such, the Court plays an important and controversial
role within the Israeli constitutional system, which belongs to the family of neither
common-law nor civil-law jurisdictions.9 As the United Kingdom, Israel does not
haveawrittenconstitution.However, theIsraeliDeclarationofIndependence, issued
on 14May 1948, envisaged the existence of a constitution for Israel. Pursuant to the
7. The most forceful opinions came from human rights organizations. See Amnesty International, ‘Israel
and the Occupied Territories: Israel must end its policy of assassinations’, 4 July 2003, MDE 15/056/2003,
available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engmde150562003. The EU also strongly condemned the
targeted killings. See Council of the European Union, Press Release, S0076/04, 22 March 2004, Brussels,
available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/declarations/79544.pdf.
The UN Secretary-General used more moderate words and ‘deeply deplored’ the killing of children and the
injury of other innocent bystanders during a targeted killing carried out on 20 June 2006. See Ofﬁce of the
Spokesperson for the Secretary-General, Statement attributable to the Spokesman for the Secretary-General
on theMiddle East, 21 June 2006, Geneva, available at http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=2099. The
UNGeneral Assembly passed several resolutions condemning the practice of targeted killings. See UNDoc.
A/RES/58/2; UNDoc. A/RES/58/96; UNDoc. A/RES/58/99; UNDoc. A/RES/57/127; UNDoc. A/RES/56/62; UN
Doc. A/RES/ES-10/12; UN Doc. A/RES/ES-10/13.
8. S. David, ‘Israel’s Policy of Targeted Killing’, (2003) 17 Ethics & International Affairs 111; Y. Stein, ‘By Any
Name Illegal and Immoral’, (2003) 17 Ethics & International Affairs 127; S. David, ‘Reply to Yael Stein: If Not
Combatants, Certainly Not Civilians’, (2003) 17 Ethics & International Affairs 138; A. Guiora, ‘Targeted Killing
as Active Self-Defense’, (2004) 36 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 319; O. Ben-Naftali and
K. Michaeli, ‘We Must Not Make a Scarecrow of the Law: A Legal Analysis of the Israeli Policy of Targeted
Killings’, (2003) 36 Cornell International Law Journal 233; E. Gross, ‘Thwarting Terrorists Acts by Attacking
the Perpetrators or Their Commanders as an Act of Self-Defense: Human Rights Versus the State’s Duty
to Protect its Citizens’, (2001) 15 Temple International & Comparative Law Journal 195; N. Kendall, ‘Israeli
Counter-terrorism: “Targeted Killings” under International Law’, (2002) 80North Carolina Law Review 1069;
D. Kretzmer, ‘Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-judicial Executions or Legitimate Means of
Defence?’, (2000) 16 EJIL 171; T. Ruys, ‘License to Kill? State-Sponsored Assassination under International
Law’, (2005) 22 (1–2) Military Law and Law of War Review 13; G. Nolte, ‘Preventative Use of Force and
Preventative Killings: Moves into a Different Legal Order’, (2004) 5 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 111, at 119; D.
Statman, ‘Targeted Killing’, (2004) 5 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 179.
9. Under the Ottoman Empire, the territory then called Palestine was subject to a mixture of Islamic law and
modern laws adopted by Turkey.When Turkeywas defeated in the FirstWorldWar and the BritishMandate
was established, theMandatory government retained the pre-existing law and, through Art. 46 of the King’s
Order in Council, 1922, ruled that the law that was in force before the British takeover ‘will remain in force
to the extent that it does not conﬂict with the changes that occurred as a result of the conquest and that in
the event of a legal lacuna, the principles of English Common law and equity will apply’. Pursuant to Art.
46 of the King’s Ordinance, the English legal system, including the jurisdiction of the English courts, was
imported into Palestine. Following the establishment of the state of Israel on 14 May 1948, one of the ﬁrst
legislative texts to be issued by the Provisional Council of State (which was superseded by the Knesset, the
Israeli parliament) was the Administration and Law Ordinance, which followed the tradition of preserving
the existing law and provided that it ‘will remain in force insofar as it is not repugnant to this ordinance or
other (later enacted) laws and subject to such modiﬁcations necessitated by the establishment of the State
and its institutions’. As a result of this, British law continued to inﬂuence the Israeli legal system for a long
time after the establishment of the state through the lasting effects of Art. 46 of the King’s Order. The direct
application of English law was abolished with time as new inﬂuences, particularly those originating from
German law, were included in Israeli legislation. See also I. Zamir and S. Colombo, The Law of Israel: General
Surveys (1995), at 2.
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1950 Harari Resolution, the Knesset instructed the Constitution, Law, and Justice
Committee to establish the Israeli constitution chapter by chapter (these would be
called Basic Laws), instead of as a single document. Until 1992 the Basic Laws did
not automatically take precedence over regular laws unless explicit entrenchment
clauses provided for such supremacy.10 The Supreme Court had the power to strike
down legislation only if it violated a Basic Lawwith an entrenchment clause, which
were very few at the time.
The situation changed in 1992, when two additional entrenched laws were ad-
opted, namely the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, and the Basic Law: Human
Dignity and Liberty.11 They renewed the desire to enact awritten constitution for Is-
rael and initiated anewera in Israeli constitutional law, spearheadedbyChief Justice
Barak.12 In fact, Barakconsidered that, due to the speciﬁcclauses that theycontained,
the two Basic Laws entailed that all Basic Laws preceded ordinary legislation.13 As
a result, the Supreme Court played an important role in the constitutional context
and assumed the power of judicial review of Knesset legislation violating any Basic
Law.14
In its function as appellate court, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear
criminal and civil appeals from judgments of the district courts. Generally, the
Israeli judicial system is based on the principle that each case should have one
instance for appeal. Consequently, the district courts (which are the second instance
in the Israeli judicial system) hear appeals from the local courts and the Supreme
Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from judgments issued by the district courts
as the ﬁrst instance. Cases can go through several instances of appeal in limited
circumstances. For example, when the district court acts as an appellate court, the
matter can then be brought before the Supreme Court at its discretion.
When sitting as the High Court of Justice, the Supreme Court exercises judicial
review over the other branches of government. It can review cases which are not
withinthe jurisdictionofanyothercourtandinwhichitconsiders that it isnecessary
togrant relief in the interestsof justice.Theseareoftenhigh-proﬁlecaseschallenging
acts of high-ranking government ofﬁcials. This function is unique to the Israeli
system, given that the Supreme Court acts as a court of ﬁrst and last instance.
The number of Justices working for the Court is established by a Knesset resol-
ution. As a general rule, the most senior justice is the President (Chief Justice) of
10. Ibid., at 8; The Knesset, The Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, Constitution for Israel Project, The
History of the Constitution of Israel, available at http://www.cﬁsrael.org//a23.html?rsID=278.
11. Zamir and Colombo, supra note 9, at 8. Both laws included a limitation clause forbidding violations of rights
except by a law beneﬁting the values of the state of Israel (enacted for a proper purpose and to an extent
no greater than is required). In addition, the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation included an entrenchment
clause which provided that it cannot be amended except by a basic law passed by a majority of Knesset
members.
12. S. Shetreet, Justice in Israel: A Study of the Israeli Judiciary (1994), at 2; A. Barak, ‘The Constitutional Revolution:
Protected Human Rights’, (1992) 1Mishpar U’Mimshal 9.
13. Shetreet, supra note 12, at 2.
14. Ibid.
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the Court and the next senior justice is the Deputy President.15 The President of the
Court is theheadof the entire judicial system in Israel.16 The current President of the
Court is Dorit Beinisch and the Deputy President is Eliezer Rivlin.17 Aharon Barak,
the former President of the Court, retired in September 2006, but continued to be
involved in theCourt’s decisionsuntilDecember2006 (Israeli lawprovides a retiring
judge with three months to complete his opinions on pending cases). When judges
sit together they are all equal, and there is no difference in importance between
their opinions. The Supreme Court generally sits in panels of three justices.18 After
reaching a verdict, the judges usually appoint one of their number to draft the lead-
ing opinion giving reasons for the decision. Subsequently, every other justice on
the panel may either fully agree with the leading opinion or add a dissenting or a
concurring opinion.
1.4. The purpose of the analysis
The aim of this article is to evaluate the impact of the Israeli Supreme Court’s de-
cision on the legality of targeted killing and to map out the manifold changes and
improvements that will arise in any future application of this policy.19 The authors
question the underlying assumption of the legality of targeted killing. They endeav-
our todemonstrate that the situations inwhich targetedkillingwas considered tobe
legal were too broadly deﬁned. One of the central points to be discussed within this
framework is the extent towhich the decision uses international humanitarian law
(IHL) and contributes towards its clariﬁcation. By evaluating recent trends in this
rather ambiguous ﬁeld of international humanitarian law, it will be demonstrated,
on the one hand, that Chief Justice Barak has been very receptive and has resorted
to a wide array of international legal sources, literature as well as international
decisions. On the other hand, it will be seen that there are also several limitations
in this judgment that will need to be taken up in the upcoming cases. As the de-
cision demonstrates, domestic courts are currently dealing with certain lacunae of
international humanitarian lawwhich need to be addressed promptly.
The analysis of the case is conducted in ﬁve steps. First, it will be seen that the
Court’s qualiﬁcation of the situation as an international armed conﬂict is compliant
with international humanitarian law. Here, unfortunately, the Court missed an
opportunity to pay further attention to the application of the law of belligerent
15. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Judiciary: The Court System, available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/
government/branches%20of%20government/judicial/the%20judiciary-%20the%20court%20system.
16. Ibid.
17. The remaining members of the Court are Justice Ayala Procaccia, Justice Edmond Levy, Justice Asher Dan
Grunis, Justice Miriam Naor, Justice Edna Arbel, Justice Elyakim Rubinstein, Justice Esther Hayut, Justice
Salim Joubran, Justice Shoshana Leibovic, and Justice Yigal Mersel.
18. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supra note 15.
19. Due to lack of space, this article does not address the justiciability of targeted killing, which is anothermajor
development following the judgment. In fact, the questionof targeted killingwas found to benon-justiciable
in an earlier decision. See HCJ 5872/01, Barakeh v. Prime Minister, 56(3) PD 1, 29 January 2002. For further
information, see Ben-Naftali and Michaeli, supra note 2. Barak, however, decided that the Court could rule
on the issue. Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, supra note 1, Opinion of Chief
Justice Barak, paras. 47–54. See also Cassese, supra note 1, at 340–1; Ben-Naftali, supra note 1, at 326.
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occupation as well as to the relationship between international humanitarian and
human rights law. Second, it will become apparent that the Court’s characterization
of terrorists as civilians is accurate, despite the existing alternative approaches.
Third, the Court’s interpretation of the various components of the notion of ‘direct
participation in hostilities’ will be considered. It will be demonstrated that Barak’s
interpretation of this notion is very broad and that it should be narrowed down
in order to comply fully with the presumption of the protection of civilians as
enshrined in international humanitarian law. Finally, this article will also attempt
to answer the general question underpinning the issue of targeted killing, namely
whether it should be treated as an exception in international humanitarian law.
Throughout his opinion, Chief Justice Barak resorted to dynamic and teleological
interpretation to adapt the law to present conditions.20 Usually, he ﬁrst delineated
the contours of a given issue by enumerating two extreme examples, and then,
in the margin between them, he used a balancing test to determine how the law
would apply to speciﬁc cases that ran into the legal ‘grey zone’. This task was
rendered difﬁcult by the fact that international humanitarian law on the conduct of
hostilities is ratherbroadandambiguousandmaynotoffergreatcertainty inguiding
combatants.21 Independently of the view taken on the substance of the judgment, it
is undeniable that Barak’s efforts to ﬂesh out as much as possible certain standards
to be applied during attacks on civilians participating directly in hostilities were
admirable.Also, the exampleswhichhepresentedmaybehelpful for those involved
in deciding on the approach to adopt in combat.22
2. ANALYSIS OF CHIEF JUSTICE BARAK’S REASONING
2.1. Qualiﬁcation of the conﬂict
2.1.1. The nature of the conﬂict
The Israeli–Palestinian conﬂict is a sensitive, multifaceted and extremely complex
situation. It is an arduous task to characterize it under international humanitarian
law. Due to the fact that they do not constitute a state, the Occupied Territories have
a rather complex status in international humanitarian law. In this context, several
interpretations of the conﬂict as well as of the content of the rights and obligations
attributed to civilians and combatants have been formulated. Among the options
available, Chief Justice Barak appears to have reached a satisfactory solution by
qualifying the conﬂict as an international armed conﬂict. This, in turn, resulted in
attributing substantial protection to the civilians affected. It will be demonstrated
that, as part of Barak’s interpretation, itwouldhavebeenpossible toprotect civilians
even further.
20. For further information regarding Barak’s perceptions on the role of a judge, his interpretation techniques,
his judicial philosophy, and his reasoning style, see A. Barak, The Judge in a Democracy (2006).
21. Cassese, supra note 1, at 342. According to Cassese, this is due to two reasons: ‘First, it is objectively difﬁcult
to lay down precise and speciﬁc legal standards in the area at issue . . . Second, states, in particular major
powers, have demonstrated themselves prepared to leave these standards as loose as possible, in order to
retain a broadmargin of manoeuvre when engaged in combat.’ Ibid.
22. Ibid., at 343.
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2.1.2. The threshold for the application of international humanitarian law
In determining whether international humanitarian law applies to any given situ-
ation, it is necessary to evaluate ﬁrst whether the required threshold has been
reached. International humanitarian law applies in two types of situations, namely
in international armed conﬂicts and in non-international conﬂicts. It does not ap-
ply to ‘situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and
sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed
conﬂicts’.23 Thus a given situation must ﬁrst reach the level of an ‘armed conﬂict’
or ‘hostilities’ in order to trigger the application of the Geneva Conventions and the
Additional Protocols.
The concept of ‘armed conﬂict’ was deﬁnedmore precisely in the ﬁrst case before
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Prosecutor v.
Dusˇko Tadic´,24 where it was found that ‘an armed conﬂict exists whenever there is
a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between govern-
mental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State.
International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conﬂicts
and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace
is reached’.25 In addition, although not ratiﬁed by Israel, it is interesting to note that
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court26 recognizes the existence
of such armed conﬂicts in Article 8 Section 2(f): ‘It applies to armed conﬂicts that
take place in the territory of a State when there is protracted armed conﬂict between
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups’.27
In his opinion, Chief Justice Barak used a similar reasoning to that used in Tadic´
with regard to the threshold of application of IHL. He explained that ‘a continuous
situation of armed conﬂict has existed since the ﬁrst intifada’,28 which has been
recognized in the previous decisions of the SupremeCourt as well as in the relevant
literature. Having established that an armed conﬂict exists and that IHL applies,
Justice Barak went on to evaluate the type of conﬂict involved in this case.29
2.1.3. An international armed conﬂict
Differentiating internationalconﬂicts fromnon-internationalconﬂictsmayat times
prove to be difﬁcult. Although Chief Justice Barak classiﬁed the Israeli–Palestinian
conﬂict as an international armed conﬂict, this ﬁnding is not self-evident, since
international conﬂicts have been traditionally fought between states.30 However, as
23. ProtocolAdditional to theGenevaConventionsof 12August 1949, and relating to theProtectionofVictimsof
Non-international Armed Conﬂicts (Additional Protocol II), 1125 UNTS 609, entered into force 7 December
1978. Israel is not a state party.
24. Prosecutor v. Tadic´, Decision on the DefenceMotion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-94–
1-AR72, A.Ch., 2 October 1995.
25. Ibid., para. 70 (emphasis added).
26. RomeStatute of the InternationalCriminalCourt, 2187UNTS90, entered into force 1 July 2002. Itwas signed
by Israel on 31 December 2000. However, Israel announced that it would not proceed to the ratiﬁcation.
27. Ibid. (emphasis added).
28. Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, supra note 1, Opinion of Chief Justice Barak,
para. 16.
29. Ibid.
30. Additional Protocol I enlarged this notion of international armed conﬂict by providing in Art. 1(4) that it
covers ‘armed conﬂicts in which peoples are ﬁghting against colonial domination and alien occupation and
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noted by Gross, ‘[t]his is not the case in the Palestinian–Israeli conﬂict. As Palestine
has not been recognized as an independent State, it is atmost a “State in themaking”
or an independent political authority’.31
Thepetitioners argued that the legal systemapplicable to theconﬂict includes the
law of policing and law enforcement (as part of the law of belligerent occupation)
and that it prohibits killing someonewithout dueprocess, arrest, and trial. However,
Chief Justice Barak found that the situation should be considered instead as an
ongoing international armed conﬂict. He grounded his reasoning in a statement
written by Antonio Cassese, who considered that ‘An armed conﬂict which takes
place between an Occupying Power and rebel or insurgent groups – whether or not
they are terrorist in character – in anoccupied territory, amounts to an international
armed conﬂict.’32 Cassese provided three reasons in support of his argument:
(1) internal armed conﬂicts are those between a central government and a group of
insurgents belonging to the same State (or between two or more insurrectional groups
belonging to that State); (2) the object and purpose of international humanitarian
law impose that in case of doubt the protection deriving from this body of law be as
extensive as possible, and it is indisputable that the protection accorded by the rules on
international conﬂicts is much broader than that relating to internal conﬂicts; (3) as
belligerent occupation is governed by the FourthGenevaConvention33 and customary
law, it would be contradictory to subject occupation to norms relating to international
conﬂict while regulating the conduct of armed hostilities between insurgents and the
Occupant on the strength of norms governing internal conﬂict.34
For Cassese, ‘[i]t follows that the rules on international armed conﬂict also apply
to the armed clashes between insurgents in occupied territories and the belligerent
Occupant’.35
In Barak’s view, ‘the fact that the terrorist organizations and theirmembers donot
act inthenameofastatedoesnotturnthestruggleagainst themintoapurely internal
against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the
United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation among States in accordancewith theCharter of theUnitedNations’. Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conﬂicts (Additional Protocol I), 1125 UNTS 3, entered into force 7 December 1978, Art. 1(4). Unfortunately,
Additional Protocol I has not been signed by Israel. Furthermore, Art. 1(4) has generated much controversy,
thereby precluding it being considered as customary law. See Ben-Naftali and Michaeli, supra note 8, at
256. For this reason, it is not applicable to the Israeli–Palestinian conﬂict. Still, if Additional Protocol I
had been ratiﬁed by Israel and Art. 1(4) applied, it is debatable whether Hamas could be considered as a
party to the conﬂict. The United Nations General Assembly has recognized that Palestinian people have a
right to self-determination without external interference as well as a right to national independence and
sovereignty. This was recognized in a situation where the Palestinians were represented by the Palestine
Liberation Organization which, under the leadership of Yasser Arafat, was granted observer status at the
United Nations.
31. Gross, supra note 8, at 196.
32. A.Cassese, International Law (2005), at 420. In response to this statement, it canbeargued that thepreliminary
determination whether the situation constitutes an ‘armed conﬂict’ was superﬂuous. The sole fact of the
occupation would have been sufﬁcient to characterize the conﬂict as an international armed conﬂict.
33. Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 UNTS 287, entered into force
21 October 1950, for Israel 6 July 1951.
34. Cassese, supra note 32, at 420 (emphasis in original).
35. Ibid.
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state conﬂict’.36 In support of this, he referred to Cassese’s opinion on the topic and
added that ‘in today’s reality, a terrorist organization is likely to have considerable
military capabilities. At times, they have military capabilities that exceed those of
states.’37
It should be acknowledged that opinions to the contrary exist. In fact, the Israeli–
Palestinian conﬂict has been interpreted by a few UN bodies as a non-international
conﬂict.38 In this context, activemembers of organized armedgroupswere classiﬁed
as combatants despite the fact that they do not enjoy the privileges attributed to
combatants in international law.39 This view has been recently taken a step further.
Ithasbeenargued that thereare twoconﬂicts: one is international and theothernon-
international. In this context, organized armed groups having a combatant function
became a party to a non-international conﬂict with Israel, a conﬂict that grew out of
an international armed conﬂict.40 It is, however, beyond the scope of this article to
consider in greater detail the advantages and disadvantages of each interpretation
of the conﬂict at hand.
Despite the existence of these various evaluations, it is submitted that the teleolo-
gical and dynamic interpretation adopted by Cassese and followed by Barak in his
opinion is appropriate, as it grants substantial protection to innocent civilians41 and
achieves results similar to the alternative approaches. Also, given that Barak’s reas-
oning is less sophisticated, it provides a pattern that domestic courts unaccustomed
to using international humanitarian lawmay ﬁnd easier to follow.
2.1.4. The law of belligerent occupation
Following this decision, it is not clear whether all the rights enshrined in the Fourth
GenevaConvention42 are enforceable in the context of targeted killing.While Chief
Justice Barak didmention that targeted killing is not to be carried outwhen arrest is
possible,43 he did not elaborate further about the situation following themoment of
capture. Thus the requirements relating to conditions of imprisonment and proced-
ural guarantees fall beyond the scope of the decision. This is also the case for all the
36. Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, supra note 1, Opinion of Chief Justice Barak,
para. 21.
37. Ibid.
38. Question of the Violation of Human Rights in the Occupied Arab Territories, Including Palestine: Report of
theHumanRights Inquiry Commission Established Pursuant to Commission Resolution S-5/1 of 19October
2000, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2001/121 (2001), at 12–13, para. 39. The following is stated in para. 39 of the Report:
‘Clearly, there is no international armed conﬂict in the region, as Palestine, despite widespread recognition,
still falls short of the accepted criteria of statehood.’ JudgeKooijmans also opined that the Israeli–Palestinian
conﬂict is a non-international one. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, AdvisoryOpinionof 9 July2004, [2004] ICJRep. 136, at 229–30 (JudgeKooijmans, SeparateOpinion),
paras. 35–36. See also Ben-Naftali andMichaeli, supra note 8, at 256, and Kretzmer, supra note 8, at 210.
39. Ben-Naftali andMichaeli, supra note 8, at 271; Kretzmer, supra note 8, at 210.
40. N. Melzer, ‘Targeted Killing under the International Normative Paradigms of Law Enforcement and Hostilit-
ies’, doctoral dissertation,Department of Law,University of Zurich, 2007, 445–6 (published asTargetedKilling
in International Law (2008, forthcoming), 351).
41. It is submitted, however, that Chief Justice Barak could have gone further as part of this interpretation by
granting evenmore protection to civilians.
42. Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time ofWar, supra note 33.
43. Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, supra note 1, Opinion of Chief Justice Barak,
para. 40.
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other rights of protected persons as enshrined in the Convention. The inadequate
analysis of this point remains a serious limitation of the judgment.44 The question
needs to be clariﬁed further in future decisions.
Having qualiﬁed the conﬂict in the case, Barak clariﬁed that the law of inter-
national armed conﬂict includes the law of belligerent occupation. This was often
a point of controversy: Israel has claimed that the law of belligerent occupation
does not apply to the conﬂict, arguing that there was no sovereign power at whose
expense the territorieswere to be occupied, as Jordan’s sovereignty in theWest Bank
was questionable and Egypt has never asserted sovereignty over the Gaza Strip.45
Israel also asserted that despite its adherence to the Fourth Geneva Convention,46
within themeaning of the sameConvention it was not bound to treat the territories
as occupied.47 Israel did, however, recognize that it would apply to the Occupied
Territories some of the humanitarian provisions contained therein on a de facto
basis.48 Despite these arguments, the International Court of Justice recognized in
its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory that Israel was the occupying power in theWest Bank
and that the FourthGenevaConvention did indeed apply (theAdvisoryOpinion did
not concern the Gaza Strip).49 According to the Commission of Enquiry established
by the Commission onHuman Rights to investigate violations of human rights and
humanitarian law in the occupied Palestinian territories, the conﬂict falls under
the Fourth Geneva Convention.50 Furthermore, the Report of the Secretary-General
preparedpursuant toGeneralAssembly resolutionES−10/2of25April 199751 stated
that Israel is theonlyhighcontractingparty thatdoesnot recognize theapplicability
of the Fourth Geneva Convention: ‘All other High Contracting Parties, as well as the
International Committee of the Red Cross, have retained their consensus that the
Convention does apply de jure to the occupied territories’.52 In addition, therewas a
‘very large number of resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General
Assembly oftenunanimously or by overwhelmingmajorities, including binding de-
cisions of the Council and other resolutions which, while not binding, nevertheless
produce legaleffectsandindicateaconstantrecordof the internationalcommunity’s
44. See also Ben-Naftali andMichaeli, supra note 1, at 464.
45. Question of the Violation of Human Rights in the Occupied Arab Territories, supra note 38, at 11, para. 35.
46. Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time ofWar, supra note 33.
47. Question of the Violation of Human Rights in the Occupied Arab Territories, supra note 38, at 11, para. 35.
48. Ibid.
49. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, supra note 38. See Judge
Kooijmans’ Separate Opinion, at 222, para. 9; Judge Al-Khasawneh’s Separate Opinion, at 236, para. 4; Judge
Buergenthal’s Separate Opinion, at 240, para. 2; Judge Owada’s Separate Opinion, at 270–1, para. 30.
50. Question of the Violation of Human Rights in the Occupied Arab Territories, supra note 38, at 13, para. 41.
51. UN Doc. No. A/RES/ES-10/2.
52. Report of the Secretary-General prepared pursuant to General Assembly resolution ES-10/2 of 25 April 1997,
Tenth emergency special session, Agenda item 5, Illegal Israeli Actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the
Rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, UN Doc. A/165–10/6-S/1997/494, 26 June 1997, para. 21. This
was also noted by Judge Al-Khasawneh in his Separate Opinion in the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on the Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, supra note 38 (underlining in
original), at 236, para. 4.
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opinio juris’53 that the lawof belligerent occupation applies to the Israeli–Palestinian
conﬂict.
Nonetheless, Chief Justice Barak did not consider further the content of the rights
afforded to the population under occupation and the obligations imposed upon
Israel. The Israeli Supreme Court has not always been very open to the idea that the
Fourth Geneva Convention applies to the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.54 Perhaps
it was not desirable to decide this sensitive question here and potentially restrain
Israeliactionduringongoinghostilities. Itcouldalsobethatthequestionwasslightly
different from the one lying at the heart of this case, namely the legality of targeted
killing. Clearly, acknowledging that all the rights contained in the Convention are
enforceable would have had wide-ranging political and legal implications for the
Israeli–Palestinian conﬂict. Also, recognizing the enforceability of certain Articles
mayhavebeenthought tobeprecipitatedby theCourt.Despite theseconsiderations,
one could have reasonably expected the Chief Justice to consider the rights of
the Occupied Territories’ inhabitants and Israel’s obligations towards them in this
landmark case which will undeniably affect the civilian population.
2.1.5. Selective references to international human rights law
Another fundamental issueconsideredbytheCourt in thedecision is theapplication
of human rights law to the Israeli–Palestinian conﬂict. This question is not devoid
of complexity, given that it is not entirely clear to what extent international hu-
manitarian law and international human rights can interact within the framework
of international armed conﬂicts. In addition, a recent phenomenon transcending
public international law– ‘fragmentation’,55 which is also apparent in the reasoning
of the Chief Justice – complicates the interpretation even further.56
There is a rich academic debate with regard to the degree that international hu-
man rights law and international humanitarian law interact.57 There is a disagree-
ment among scholars with regard to the exact meaning and nature of this relation-
ship. Nonetheless, the prevailing view in this ﬁeld seems to be that international
53. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, supra note 38, Judge
Al-Khasawneh’s Separate Opinion, at 236, para. 3. It should be noted that most of the documents re-
ferred to by Judge Al-Khasaweh in the citation above can be found here: United Nations Information
Service on the Question of Palestine, UN Resolutions, available at http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/UNper
cent20resolutions!OpenPage.
54. For further details see D. Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice: The Supreme Court of Israel and the Occupied
Territories (2002), at 43–56.
55. See M. Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law: Difﬁculties Arising form the Diversiﬁcation and
Expansion of International Law – Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, Geneva,
UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006.
56. In recent years, it appears that the scope of international law has increased dramatically and specialized
autonomous legal systems have emerged. Areas that were once regulated by general international law
could now fall under several specialized international legal systems. As noted by the International Law
Commission, ‘[s]omecommentatorshavebeenhighly critical ofwhat theyhave seenas the erosionof general
international law, emergence of conﬂicting jurisprudence, forum shopping and loss of legal security’. See
ibid., at 12, para. 9.
57. See e.g. T. Meron, ‘The Humanization of Humanitarian Law’, (2000) 94 AJIL 239; Ruys, supra note 8, at 22 f.,
30; Kretzmer, supranote 8, at 210;Melzer, supranote 40, at 254; Ben-Naftali andMichaeli, supranote 8, at 289;
K.Watkin, ‘Controlling theUse of Force: A Role for HumanRights Norms in Contemporary ArmedConﬂict’,
(2004) 98 AJIL 1, at 24, 34.
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humanitarian law is the lex specialis during hostilities and international human
rights law is superseded or derogated from in these circumstances.
Chief JusticeBarakfollowedthedirectionofthisprevailingview.First,heobserved
that ‘humanitarian law is the lex specialiswhich applies in the case of armed conﬂict.
Where there is a gap (lacuna) in that law, it can be supplemented by human rights
law’.58 In support of this statement, the Chief Justice quoted twoAdvisory Opinions
of the International Court of Justice, namely the Opinion relating to the Legality
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons59 and the Opinion pertaining to the Legal
Consequences of the Construction of aWall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,60 as well
as a decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), Bankovic v. Belgium.61
Clearly, there are situations where both systems can come into play. As the
InternationalCourtof Justicenoted in itsAdvisoryOpinionontheLegalConsequences
of the Construction of aWall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
[T]he protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in case of armed
conﬂict, save through the effect of provisions for derogation of the kind to be found
in Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. As regards the
relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law, there are
thus three possible situations: some rightsmay be exclusivelymatters of international
humanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others
may be matters of both these branches of international law. In order to answer the
question put to it, theCourtwill have to take into consideration both of these branches
of international law, namely human rights law and, as lex specialis, international hu-
manitarian law.62
Humanrightsnormscanalso interact in internationalhumanitarian lawthrough
Article 75 of Additional Protocol I,63 which protects an important number of them.
Although Israel did not ratify Additional Protocol I, Article 75 can be regarded
as declaratory of customary law.64 There are also several important human rights
58. Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, supra note 1, Opinion of Chief Justice Barak,
para. 18.
59. Legality of the Threat or Use of NuclearWeapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, [1996] ICJ Rep. 226.
60. Ibid. It was stated, at 240 in para. 25,
The Court observes that the protection of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights
does not cease in times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain
provisions may be derogated from in a time of national emergency. Respect for the right to life is
not, however, such a provision. In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one’s life
applies also in hostilities. The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to
be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conﬂict which is
designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities. Thuswhether a particular loss of life, through the use
of a certain weapon in warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article
6 of the Covenant, can only be decided by reference to the law applicable in armed conﬂict and not
deduced from the terms of the Covenant itself.
61. Bankovic and Others v. Belgium and Others (Appl. 52207/99), ECtHR Decision (G.C.) of 12 December 2001,
Reports 2001-XII, at 335.
62. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, supra note 38, at 178, para.
106.
63. Additional Protocol I, supra note 30; K. Watkin, ‘Warriors without Rights? Combatants, Unprivileged Bel-
ligerents, and Struggle over Legitimacy’, Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conﬂict Research,
Occasional Paper, Winter 2005, at 69.
64. Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, supra note 1, Opinion of Chief Justice Barak,
para. 25.
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included in the Fourth Geneva Convention65 which apply in the Occupied Territ-
ories. In addition, the ICRC Study on International Customary Humanitarian Law
enumerates a wide array of human rights in Rules 87 to 105,66 and draws on the
jurisprudence of various international human rights bodies.67
In this part of his reasoning, the Chief Justice also referred to the human rights
enshrined in international humanitarian law:
Needless to say, unlawful combatants are not beyond the law. They are not ‘outlaws’.
God created them as well in his image; their human dignity as well is to be honoured;
they as well enjoy and are entitled to protection, even if most minimal, by customary
international law.68
In his opinion Justice Rivlin further clariﬁed this point when he considered that
‘[b]oth normative systems applicable to armed conﬂict are united, in that they place
in their centres the principle of human dignity.’69 The commondenominator of these
two passages is important, as it demonstrates that human dignity is a value that
international human rights law and international humanitarian law share.
Barak further remarks that international humanitarian law is a compromise
between military and humanitarian needs. In this context, he balanced individual
rights and dignity against military need and success, observing that
The result of that balancing is that human rights are protected by the law of armed
conﬂict, butnot to their full scope.The same is so regarding themilitaryneeds.Theyare
given an opportunity to be fulﬁlled, but not to their full scope. The balancing reﬂects
the relativity of human rights and the limits of military needs. The balancing point is
not constant.70
Here, Chief Justice Barak applied the lex specialis rule in a similar way to the In-
ternational Court of Justice in the Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of
the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,71 as he recognized the
continuous applicability of international human rights law to a situation of armed
conﬂict.72
Chief Justice Barak also alluded to international human rights law when he
stated that ‘[t]he principle of proportionality is a general principle in law. It is part
65. Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time ofWar, supra note 33.
66. J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law (2005), Vol. I, at 299–383.
67. See H. Krieger, ‘A Conﬂict of Norms: The Relationship Between Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law
in the ICRC Customary Law Study’, (2006) 11 Journal of Conﬂict & Security Law 265.
68. Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, supra note 1, Opinion of Chief Justice Barak,
para. 25 (emphasis added).
69. Ibid., Opinion of Justice Rivlin, para. 4 (emphasis added).
70. Ibid., para. 22.
71. Legal Consequences of the Construction of aWall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, supra note 38.
72. Despite this, the Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, a decision of considerable importance for the Israeli–Palestinian conﬂict, was only
relied on once by the Chief Justice, namely in the speciﬁc context of the relationship between international
humanitarian and human rights law. Interestingly, it was not used to bolster the Chief Justice’s conclusion
that the law of belligerent occupation applies in the Occupied Territories, although this was clearly one
of the ﬁndings of the International Court of Justice. The reason behind this selective and rare reliance on
the Advisory Opinion could be due to the far-reaching legal consequences for Israel ﬂowing from the ICJ’s
ﬁndings.
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of our legal conceptualization of human rights.’73 However, the subsequent part of
this argument revealed that he is not referring to the principle of proportionality
under international human rights law, but rather to the principle of proportionality
inherent in international humanitarian law. Additionally, one may legitimately
question why Chief Justice Barak did not mention here the rights of ‘protected
persons’ included in the Fourth Geneva Convention.
Overall, within the framework of his balancing test, Barak’s treatment of the
interactions between international human rights and humanitarian law com-
plies with the position prevailing in international humanitarian law. This clarity
breaks down when the Chief Justice considers the principle of proportionality. His
reasoning here was probably inﬂuenced by the increasingly fragmented inter-
national legal system and the overlapping international humanitarian and human
rights law. The application of the lex specialis rule throughout the judgment to some
extent minimized such confusions.74 Despite this, the relationship between both
systems as envisaged by Chief Justice Barak should be explained further. Also, the
degree towhich internationalhuman rights lawapplies to the situation shouldhave
beenmore clearly stated. These clariﬁcations are needed in order to avoid confusion
in future cases relating to targeted killing.
2.2. Qualiﬁcation of terrorists
In order to pursue the balancing of interests in the case further, Chief Justice Barak
neededtoexaminethestatusof the terrorists targeted inthe lightof internationalhu-
manitarianlaw.Theclassiﬁcationestablishedunder internationalhumanitarianlaw
provides two possible categories of persons, namely combatants and civilians. Com-
batants and military objectives are legitimate targets for military attack, although
not every act of combat is allowed against them.75 Civilians and civilian objectives
cannot be attacked, provided that they do not take direct part in hostilities.76
Chief Justice Barak found that terrorists do not fulﬁl the criteria for being com-
batants. Combatants are usually considered to be members of the armed forces of a
party to the conﬂict, ormembers ofmilitias or volunteer corps forming part of such
armed forces. Article 1 of the Hague Regulations provides that
The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia and
volunteer corps fulﬁlling the following conditions:
73. Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, supra note 1, Opinion of Chief Justice Barak,
para. 41.
74. There are some difﬁculties associated with the application of the lex specialis rule: ‘In particular two sets of
difﬁcultiesmay be highlighted. First, it is often hard to distinguishwhat is “particular” and paying attention
to the substantive coverage of a provision or to the number of legal subjects to whom it is directed one may
arrive at different conclusions. . . . Second, the principle also has an unclear relationship to other maxims
of interpretation or conﬂict-solution techniques such as, for instance, the principle lex posterior derogat legi
priori (later law overrides prior law) and may be offset by normative hierarchies or informal views about
“relevance” or “importance”.’ Koskenniemi, supra note 55, at 35–6, para. 58 (emphasis in original). Despite
this, the lex specialis rule ‘is a widely acceptedmaxim of legal interpretation and technique for the resolution
of normative conﬂicts’. Ibid., at 34, para. 56.
75. Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, supra note 1, Opinion of Chief Justice Barak,
para. 23.
76. Ibid.
THE ISRAELI SUPREME COURT’S JUDGMENT ON TARGETED KILLING 199
1. To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
2. To have a ﬁxed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance;
3. To carry arms openly; and
4. To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.77
Barak argued that terrorists have noﬁxed recognizable emblemand that they donot
conduct their operations in accordance with laws and customs of war. According to
his view, terrorists are not members of the armed forces or any units with similar
status, which entails that they do not fulﬁl the criteria for being considered as com-
batants. Thus they cannot be granted prisoner-of-war status, although they can be
prosecuted for theirmembershipof terrorist organizationsand theirparticipation in
hostilities. However, they could potentially be considered as ‘unlawful combatants’,
which is a category of persons regulated under Israeli law.78 The existence of this
classiﬁcation in international humanitarian law ishighlydisputed andChief Justice
Barak took no stance with regard to its recognition.79
Instead, he found that terrorists – or ‘unlawful combatants’80 – have to be viewed
as civilians, since they do not fall under the combatant category. In support of this
argument he quoted Article 50(1) of Additional Protocol I, which provides that
Acivilian is anypersonwhodoesnot belong to oneof the categories of persons referred
to in Article 4A(1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third Convention and in Article 43 of this
Protocol. In case of doubtwhether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered
to be a civilian.81
He referred to a case before the ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blasˇkic´,82 where it was considered
that civilians are ‘personswho are not, or no longer,members of the armed forces’.83
Inhisview,thisdeﬁnitionisnegativeinnatureanditdeﬁnes ‘civilians’astheopposite
of ‘combatants’.84 Thus terroristsare tobeviewedas ‘civilians’;however, thisdoesnot
entitle them to the same protection as this category of persons under international
humanitarian law. Indeed, as noted by Barak, Article 51(3) of Additional Protocol I
provides that ‘[c]ivilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, unless
and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities’.85 According to Barak,
terrorists are both ‘unlawful combatants’ and civilians who are not entitled to the
same protections as the latter category, provided that they are taking a direct part
77. Convention (II)withRespect to the Laws andCustomsofWar onLand and its annex: Regulations concerning
the Laws and Customs ofWar on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907, 26Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 2) 949,
187 Consol. T.S. 429, entered into force on 4 September 1900. Israel is not a state party.
78. This argument is analysed in section 2.3.
79. Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, supra note 1, Opinion of Chief Justice Barak,
para. 28.
80. The use of this expression under international humanitarian law is not entirely legally correct. A better
alternative is to use the expression ‘unprivileged combatants’.
81. Additional Protocol I, supra note 30.
82. Prosecutor v. Blasˇkic´, Case No. IT-95–14, T. Ch. I, 3 March 2000.
83. Ibid., para. 180.
84. Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, supra note 1, Opinion of Chief Justice Barak,
para. 26.
85. Additional Protocol I, supra note 30.
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in hostilities at that time.86 From this, it follows that terrorists taking a direct part
in hostilities have a civilian status and combatant function, which entitle them to
neither combatant privilege nor civilian protection. The view that terrorists can be
considered as civilians is supported by abundant expert opinion.87
While Justice Rivlin accepted this line of reasoning in his concurring opinion,
he also demonstrated that it is problematic to grant civilian status to terrorists.
It was argued that the danger that terrorists represent to Israel and civilians, in
addition to the fact that the means usually used against ordinary citizens breaking
the law are insufﬁcient to ﬁght terrorists, ‘make one uneasy when attempting to
ﬁt the traditional category of “civilians” to those taking an active part in acts of
terrorism’.88 Rivlin made an interesting point by noting that those differentiating
themselves from civilians and combatants do not form a homogeneous category of
people:
They include groups which are not necessarily identical to each other in terms of
the willingness to abide by fundamental legal and human norms. It is especially
appropriate, in this context, to differentiate between unlawful combatants ﬁghting
against an army and those who purposely act against civilians.89
Indeed, there are strong reasons for not treating all unlawful combatants equally.
Despite this remark, Chief Justice Barak’s opinionon this issue appears to be com-
pliant with international humanitarian law. Clearly, it is not shared by everyone;90
however, it provides an acceptable legal framework that can be applied to a category
of persons difﬁcult to deﬁne within the framework of the lex lata, already suffering
from lack of consensus. Finally, it is also consonantwith the requirements of Article
50(1) of Additional Protocol I, which, as stated earlier, stipulates that, in case of
doubt, a person should be treated as a civilian.
86. Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, supra note 1, Opinion of Chief Justice Barak,
para. 26.
87. For instance, the UN Inquiry Commission rejected the view that individuals targeted by Israel can be
considered as combatants. See Question of the Violation of Human Rights in the Occupied Arab Territories,
supra note 38, at 19, para. 62. According to Kretzmer, international terrorists ‘do not meet the conditions
to be regarded as combatants and must, by deﬁnition, be regarded as civilians’. See Kretzmer, supra note
8, at 191–2. Watkin considers that they can be classiﬁed as civilians who momentarily lose the protection
of that status, ‘unless and for such times as they take direct part in hostilities’. Watkin, supra note 63, at
6. Zachary argues that ‘[t]errorism itself has no status under international law, but the individual terrorist
does, since he is ﬁrst and foremost a civilian. No one is born a combatant, whether lawful or not, without
being a civilian ﬁrst’. S. Zachary, ‘Between the Geneva Conventions: Where Does the Unlawful Combatant
Belong?’, (2005) 38 Israel Law Review 378, at 390. Amnesty International has also expressed the view that
Palestinian terrorists are civilians who have lost their protection: ‘Palestinians engaged in armed clashes
with Israeli forces are not combatants. They are civilians who lose their protected status for the duration
of the armed engagement. They cannot be killed at any time other than while they are ﬁring upon or
otherwise posing an immediate threat to Israeli troops or civilians.’ See Amnesty International, ‘Israel and
theOccupiedTerritories:StateAssassinationsandOtherUnlawfulKillings’,MDE15/005/2001,February2001,
at 29, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/MDE150052001ENGLISH/$File/MDE15005.01.pdf. In
addition, in his expert opinion on the legality of targeted killing, Cassese treated Palestinian terrorists in this
case as civilians. SeeA.Cassese, ExpertOpiniononwhether Israel’s TargetedKillings of PalestinianTerrorists
Is Consonant with International Humanitarian Law, Public Committee Against Torture et al. v. The Government
of Israel et al., June 2003, at 16–18.
88. Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, supra note 1, Opinion of Justice Rivlin, para. 2.
89. Ibid.
90. Ben-Naftali andMichaeli, supra note 8, at 271.
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2.3. Civilians who are unprivileged combatants
Illegitimate participants or unauthorized combatants have long taken part in hos-
tilities. However, the notion of ‘unlawful combatants’ seems only to have been ex-
plicitly acknowledged in the Ex Parte Quirin91 decision of the US Supreme Court.92
The Court deﬁned it in these words:
By universal agreement and practice, the law of war draws a distinction between the
armedforcesandthepeacefulpopulationsofbelligerentnationsandalsobetweenthose
whoare lawfulandunlawfulcombatants.Lawfulcombatantsare subject tocaptureand
detention as Prisoners of War by opposing military forces. Unlawful combatants are
likewise subject to capture and detention, but in addition, they are subject to trial and
punishment bymilitary tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful.93
In subsequent practice, the Supreme Court has resorted to the concept of ‘enemy
combatant’ and has used it up to the present day.
Despite this acknowledgement, the status of ‘unprivileged combatant’ is rather
uncertain in international humanitarian law. Only a few countries have domestic
legislation to regulate this notion. The United States has recently preferred to use
the notion of ‘unlawful enemy combatants’ to deﬁne a similar concept in the newly
enacted Military Commission Act 2006.94 Israel has enacted the Incarceration of
Unlawful Combatants Law,95 where ‘unlawful combatant’ is deﬁned as a ‘person
who has participated either directly or indirectly in hostile acts against the State of
Israel or is a member of a force perpetrating hostile acts against the State of Israel,
where the conditions prescribed in Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention of
12th August 1949 with respect to the prisoners-of-war and granting prisoner-of-war
status in international humanitarian law, do not apply to him’.96 The Law also
authorizes the chief of general staff of the Israel Defence Forces to issue an order for
the administrative detention of an ‘unlawful combatant’.97
In oral andwritten arguments the State of Israel asked the Court to recognize the
category of ‘unlawful combatants’.98 This category would be composed of people
taking an active and continuous part in an armed conﬂict, who would be treated –
contrary to the Court’s opinion – as combatants. It was argued that these persons
do not differentiate themselves from the civilian populations and that they do not
obey the laws of war. Thus they could be deprived of rights and privileges granted
to this category of persons and be legitimately targeted.
91. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 US 1 (1942).
92. J.Woolman, ‘The Legal Origins of the Term “EnemyCombatant” DoNot Support its Present DayUse’, (2005)
7 Journal of Law & Social Challenges 145, at 147. For a comprehensive overview of the history of unlawful
combatancy, seeWatkin, supra note 63, at 45–9.
93. Ibid., at 30–1.
94. TheMilitary Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–366 (S.3930), 120 Stat. 2600, § 948a(1)(A), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_bills&docid=f:s3930enr.txt.pdf.
95. Incarceration of Unlawful Combatants Law, 5762–2002, Art. 2, available at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.
org/jsource/Politics/IncarcerationLaw.pdf.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid., Art. 3(a).
98. Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, supra note 1, Opinion of Chief Justice Barak,
para. 27.
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This argument was rejected by the Chief Justice, who reasoned that ‘as far as ex-
isting law goes, the data before us are not sufﬁcient to recognize this third category.
That is thecaseaccording to thecurrent stateof international law,both international
treaty law and customary international law’.99 In addition, Chief Justice Barak re-
fused to entertain thequestionofwhether it is desirable to recognize sucha category.
TheGenevaConventionsandtheAdditionalProtocols refer toonly twocategories
of person, namely combatants and civilians. As is accurately pointed out byCassese,
No ‘intermediate status’ exists between that of combatant and the status of civilian. A
civilianwho takes direct part in hostilities does not forfeit his or her civilian status but
may become the lawful object of attack for the duration of his or her participation in
combat. The term ‘unlawful combatant’ is a shorthand expressionuseful for describing
those civilians who take up arms without being authorized to do so by international
law; it has an exclusively descriptive character.100
In line with this reasoning, Barak did not create a third category of persons.101 He
did, however, seem to acknowledge sub silentio that unprivileged combatants have a
civilian status and a combatant function. This hybrid legal concept nonetheless seems
to be accommodated by the lex lata. In fact, individuals having a combatant function
without the combatant privileges are recognized under international humanitarian
law.102
2.3.1. Applicable law
Civiliansnot takingadirectpart inhostilitiesareconsidered tobe ‘protectedpersons’
under the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.103 They have a special status under
international humanitarian law and they are immune fromattack. Three important
customary principles regulate the protection of civilians in situations of conﬂict,
namely Rules 1, 6, and 7. Rule 1 provides that the parties to the conﬂict must at
all times distinguish between civilians and combatants, and that attacks cannot
be directed at civilians.104 Rule 6 stipulates that ‘[c]ivilians are protected against
99. Ibid., para. 28.
100. Cassese, supranote 87, at 14–15, para. 26 (emphasis in original). Do¨rmann recognizes aswell that neither the
terms ‘unlawful combatant’ nor ‘unprivileged combatant/belligerent’ appear in international humanitarian
law treaties. See K. Do¨rmann, ‘The Legal Situation of “Unlawful/Unprivileged Combatants”‘, (2003) 85/849
International Review of the Red Cross 45, at 46.
101. It is importanttonotethatrecognizinganambiguouscategorywithintheexistingframeworkofinternational
humanitarian law could have serious consequences. Zachary warns that it could result in ‘a situationwhere
in every conﬂict, a State will have numerous options by which to deﬁne people it holds captive, in ways
that serve his own purposes and interests. The creation of a legal hybrid through which States can . . . enjoy
only the advantages provided by the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions, without granting the detainees
deﬁned status, is contradictory to recent trends in international law.’ Zachary, supra note 87, at 415.
102. ‘1. The armed forces of a Party to a conﬂict consist of all organized armed forces, groups and units which
are under a command responsible to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is
represented by a government or an authority not recognized by an adverse Party. Such armed forces shall
be subject to an internal disciplinary system which, “inter alia”, shall enforce compliance with the rules of
international law applicable in armed conﬂict. 2. Members of the armed forces of a Party to a conﬂict (other
thanmedical personnel and chaplains covered byArticle 33 of the ThirdConvention) are combatants, that is
to say, they have the right to participate directly in hostilities. 3.Whenever a Party to a conﬂict incorporates
a paramilitary or armed law enforcement agency into its armed forces it shall so notify the other Parties to
the conﬂict.’ Additional Protocol I, supra note 30, Art. 43.
103. Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time ofWar, supra note 33.
104. Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, supra note 66, at 3.
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attack unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities’.105 Rule 7
additionally speciﬁes that ‘[t]he parties to the conﬂict must at all times distinguish
betweencivilianobjectsandmilitaryobjectives.Attacksmayonlybedirectedagainst
military objectives. Attacks must not be directed against civilian objects’.106 Barak
considered that these rules are entrenched in the Supreme Court’s case law.
Furthermore, according to Article 51(2) of Additional Protocol I (a customary
principle in Barak’s view), ‘[t]he civilian population as such, as well as individual
civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary
purposeofwhich is tospread terroramongthecivilianpopulationareprohibited’.107
However, civilianswhodecide to takepart inhostilities areno longer subject to these
privilegesandimmunity.PursuanttoArticle51(3)ofAdditionalProtocolI, ‘[c]ivilians
shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as they
take a direct part in hostilities’.108 Chief Justice Barak accurately reminded the
court that, while Israel did not ratify Additional Protocol I, Article 51(3) expressed
a principle of international customary law and was thereby applicable to the case.
In support of his position, he cited the positions of the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC)109 and the ICTY110 as well as national military manuals and
scholarly opinion.111 In his Expert Opinion, Cassese expressed the same view.112
The precise meaning and content of Article 51(3) of Additional Protocol I is
still subject to intense debate. The provision contains three main elements – the
notion of ‘hostilities’, the notion of ‘direct participation’, and the notion of ‘for such
time’ – which have never been deﬁned in treaty law. These three expressions were
thoroughly considered during a series of ExpertMeetings,113 organized by the ICRC
in co-operation with TMC Asser Institute and aimed at clarifying the meaning of
the notion of ‘direct participation in hostilities’. However, at the time ofwriting, the
105. Ibid., at 19.
106. Ibid., at 25.
107. Additional Protocol I, supra note 30, Art. 51(2).
108. Ibid., Art. 51(3).
109. Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, supra note 66, at 20.
110. Prosecutor v. Strugar, IT-01–42-T , T.Ch. II, 31 January 2005, para. 220.
111. G. Aldrich, ‘The Laws ofWar on Land’, (2000) 94 AJIL 42, at 53; Ben-Naftali andMichaeli, supra note 8, at 269;
Cassese, supra note 32, at 416; Kretzmer, supra note 8, at 192; Y. Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the
Law of International Armed Conﬂict (2004), at 11; V. J. Proulx, ‘If the Hat Fits, Wear It, if the Turban Fits, Run
for Your Life: Reﬂection on the Indeﬁnite Detention and Targeted Killings of Suspected Terrorists’, (2005)
56 Hastings Law Journal 801, at 879; M. Roscini, ‘Targeted Killing and Contemporary Aerial Bombardment’,
(2005) 54 ICLQ 411, at 418.
112. Cassese, supra note 87, at 6, para. 10. He added that the ICTY expressed the same idea in Prosecutor v. Strugar
et al., Case No. IT-01–42-AR72, A. Ch., 22 November 2002, paras. 9–10 and Prosecutor v. Martic´, Case No.
IT-95–11-R61, T. Ch., 8 March 1996, paras. 13–14. However, in the opinion of Israel, not all parts of Art. 51(3)
of Additional Protocol I have a customary character. According to the state, the part of the Article which
determines that civilians do not enjoy protection from attack ‘for such time’ as they are taking direct part in
hostilities is not a customary rule. See Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, supra
note 1, Opinion of Chief Justice Barak, para. 30.
113. International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Hu-
manitarian Law’, Summary Report, Geneva, September 2003; International Committee of the Red
Cross/TMC Asser Institute, ‘Second Expert Meeting: Direct Participation in Hostilities under Inter-
national Humanitarian Law’, Summary Report, The Hague, 25–6 October 2004; International Commit-
tee of the Red Cross (ICRC)/TMC Asser Institute, ‘Third Expert Meeting on the Notion of Direct Parti-
cipation in Hostilities’, Summary Report, Geneva, 23–5 October 2005; all three reports are available at
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/participation-hostilities-ihl-311205.
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ﬁnal draft of the deliberations has not yet been published. During these meetings it
was agreed that the ﬁnal document will offer interpretative guidance in identifying
‘direct participation in hostilities’. The experts preferred this type of guideline to an
abstract deﬁnition supplemented by examples.
In his analysis, however, Chief Justice Barak resorted to a broad interpretation
of the components of Article 51(3) of Additional Protocol I. This approach cur-
rently complies with international humanitarian law. However, it could have been
narrower and it could have emphasized further the protection of innocent civilians.
2.3.2. Hostilities
The notion of ‘hostilities’ is used extensively in conventional law, although it is
not deﬁned therein.114 Overall, the use of the term in the convention suggests
that the notion of ‘hostilities’ is narrower than that of ‘armed conﬂict’, yet wider
than that of ‘attack’.115 During the Third Expert Meeting on ‘Direct Participation in
Hostilities’, co-organized by the ICRC and the TMC Asser Institute, the prevailing
opinion was that, on the basis of a descending scale from the widest to narrowest
concept, the followingorder couldbe established: (i) ‘armed conﬂict’; (ii) ‘hostilities’;
(iii) ‘military operations’ (they constitute a subsetwithin the conduct of ‘hostilities’)
and (iv) ‘attacks’ (they constitute an aspect of military operations’).116
During theThirdExpertMeeting, threeproposals of adeﬁnitionof the ‘hostilities’
concept were made: (i) it should include ‘all acts that adversely affect or aim to
adversely affect the enemy’s pursuance of its military objective or goal’;117 (ii) it
should comprise ‘all military activities directed against the enemy in an armed
conﬂict’118 ; and (iii) the term ‘hostilities’ should cover tactical situations rather
than an accumulation of individual acts, which are difﬁcult to deﬁne.119 As part of
this last proposal, it was argued that there is a ‘zone of hostilities’ where military
objectives120 are situated. In that case, if civilians are located in or around these
military objectives, they can be targeted (regardless of their membership in a group
or their conduct).121 It remains to be seen whether one of these proposals will
be adopted in the ﬁnal document of the deliberations that took place during the
ICRC–TMCAsser Press Meetings.
Chief Justice Barak did not follow either of these proposals. He grounded his
view in the deﬁnition of ‘hostile acts’ provided by the ICRC Commentary to Article
51(3) of Additional Protocol I mentioned above.122 This position, noted Barak, is
114. ICRC/TMCAsser Institute, ‘Third Expert Meeting’, supra note 113, at 17.
115. Ibid.
116. Ibid., at 18–19.
117. Ibid., at 22.
118. Ibid., at 23.
119. Ibid., at 24.
120. Such as houses where civilians prepared and conducted their operations or places where a car bomb was
being installed; ibid.
121. Ibid.
122. He observed that ‘acts which are intended to cause damage to civilians should be added to that deﬁnition’.
See Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, supra note 1, Opinion of Chief Justice
Barak, para. 33. Hostile acts were deﬁned as ‘acts which by their nature and purpose are intended to cause
harm to the personnel and equipment of the armd forces’. See V. Sandoz, C. Swinarski, and B. Zimmermann,
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also accepted by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and positively
received in authoritative legal literature. Thus the deﬁnition used by Chief Justice
Barak is an appropriate alternative, and this part of his opinion is not controversial.
The more contentious articulation of his argument is the reference to another
passage of the ICRC Commentary to Article 51(3) which provides that ‘the word
“hostilities” covers not only the time the civilian actually makes use of a weapon,
but also, for example, the time that he is carrying it, as well as situations in which
he undertakes hostile actswithout using aweapon’.123 This particular reference sets
up the context for his analysis of ‘direct participation’. As will become apparent in
the next section, Barak’s interpretation of this concept was wide and included an
extensive array of events.
2.3.3. Direct participation
2.3.3.1. Conventional law. The concept of ‘direct participation in hostilities’ is a
corollaryof theprinciple of distinctionbetweencivilians andcombatants enshrined
in international humanitarian law. According to the ICRC Commentary to Article
51(3) of Additional Protocol I, direct participation
means acts of war which by their nature or purpose are likely to cause actual harm
to the personnel and equipment of enemy forces. It is only during such participation
that a civilian loses his immunity and becomes a legitimate target. Once he ceases
to participate, the civilian regains his right to the protection under this Section, i.e.,
against the effect of hostilities, and hemay no longer be attacked.124
Therearealso references to theconcept inArticle77(2) and (3)ofAdditionalProtocol
I, which regulate the protection of children with regard to their participation in
hostilities.
2.3.3.2. Lack of deﬁnition. Despite these numerous references, the concept of ‘direct
participation inhostilities’ is not deﬁnedprecisely anywhere in treaty lawor in state
practice.125 There is great uncertainty as to its exact meaning and the acts that it
includes. Moreover, the wealth of scholarly opinion on the topic does not point to a
single approach to the question.
In his opinion, Chief Justice Barak observed that Articles 51(3) differentiate
between direct and indirect participation in hostilities, and states that civilians
taking an indirect part in them should not be attacked.126 He acknowledged the
problem of the lack of deﬁnition of the ‘direct participation in hostilities’ concept,
and opined that each situation should be treated on a case-by-case basis. According
to his view, it is not clear how the law may apply to certain situations, as there are
Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (1987), 618,
para. 1942.
123. Sandoz, Swinarski, and Zimmermann, supra note 122, 618–19, para. 1943.
124. Ibid., at 619, para. 1944.
125. Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, supra note 66, at 22.
126. As stated earlier, there is some room formanoeuvre in the interpretationof the concept. The ICRCComment-
aryprovides that to restrict it ‘to combat andactivemilitaryoperationswouldbe toonarrow,while extending
it to the entire war effort would be too broad, as inmodernwarfare the whole population participates in the
war effort to some extent, albeit indirectly’. See Sandoz et al., supra note 123, at 516, para. 1679.
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two interpretations possible. The ﬁrst interpretation, according to the Chief Justice,
is the one advocated by Cassese, which adopts a narrow interpretation of ‘direct’
part inhostilities in difﬁcult cases.127 The second interpretation is the one suggested
by Schmitt, which resorts to a wide interpretation of the ‘direct’ participation in
hostilities.128 Chief Justice Barak does not appear to have followed either one of
these approaches to the letter.129
Despite this lack of clarity, Barak found that there are certain cases where it can
be clearly determined whether a civilian is participating directly. On the one hand,
civilians who generally support the hostilities against the army, civilians who sell
food or medicine to unlawful combatants, civilians who aid unlawful combatants
by general strategic analysis, those who grant them logistical and general support
(including monetary aid), as well as those who distribute propaganda to support
them, would only participate indirectly in hostilities. According to Barak, ‘[i]f such
persons are injured, the State is likely not to be liable for it, if it falls into the
framework of collateral or incidental damage’.130
Ontheotherhand,civiliansbearingarms(openlyorconcealed)ontheirwaytothe
placewhere theywill use themagainst the army (at such place, or on theirway back
from it), civilians collecting intelligence on the army (on issues regarding hostilities
andbeyond), civilians transportingunlawful combatants to or from theplacewhere
hostilities are takingplace, thosewhooperate, supervise, or serviceweaponsusedby
unlawful combatants (independentof their distance to thebattleﬁeld), thosedriving
a truck carrying ammunition to the site where it will be used for the purposes
of hostilities,131 those acting deliberately as ‘human shields’,132 those who send
127. Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, supra note 1, Opinion of Chief Justice Barak,
para. 34.
128. Ibid.; M. Schmitt, ‘“Direct Participation” in Hostilities and 21st Century Armed Conﬂict’, in F. Horst et al.
(eds.), Krisensicherung und Humanita¨rer Schutz – Crisis Management and Humanitarian Protection: Festschrift fu¨r
Dieter Fleck (2004), at 505–29.
129. He did quote a passage written by Schmitt:
Grey areas should be interpreted liberally, i.e. in favour of ﬁnding direct participation. One of the
seminal purposes of the law is tomake possible a clear distinction between civilians and combatants.
Suggesting that civilians retain their immunity evenwhen they are intricately involved in a conﬂict
is to engender disrespect for the lawby combatants endangered by their activities.Moreover, a liberal
approach creates an incentive for civilians to remain as distant from the conﬂict as possible – in
doing so they can better avoid being charged with participation in the conﬂict and are less liable to
being directly targeted. (Schmitt, supra note 128, at 509)
This statement may have informed his reasoning, but he does not appear to have relied on it.
130. For the examples in this paragraph, see Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, supra
note 1, Opinion of Chief Justice Barak, paras. 34–35.
131. Ibid., paras. 34–35.
132. Ibid., para. 36. Here, Chief Justice Barak’s ﬁnding follows existing Israeli case law and it implies that using
involuntary ‘human shields’ is illegal. The SupremeCourt, sitting as theHighCourt of Justice, has previously
ruled that it is illegal for the IDF to use Palestinian civilians during military actions and that it is forbidden
to use the ‘early warning’ procedure because it contradicts international law. See Adalah – The Legal Center
for Arab Minority Rights in Israel et al. v. GOC Central Command IDF et al., HCJ 3799/02, 6 October 2005. This
stance also reﬂects the position taken in international humanitarian law. See Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time ofWar, supra note 33, Art. 28; Additional Protocol I, supra note 30. Art.
51(7). In this context, it should benoted further that the IDF JudgeAdvocateGeneral has recently ordered the
Military Police to initiate a criminal investigation into allegations that IDF soldiers have used Palestinians as
human shields during an operation in theWest Bank. See ‘Report: IDFUsed Palestinians asHumanShields in
Nablus’, Jerusalem Post, 16 March 2007; C. Urquhart, ‘Israel Accused of Using Palestinian Children as Human
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terrorists, and those who decide upon an attack as well as those who have planned
it133 are taking a ‘direct part in hostilities’.
Chief Justice Barak’s ﬁnding that voluntary ‘human shields’ take a direct part in
hostilities deserves further attention, given that the recent trend in international
humanitarian lawinthis regardhasbeenequivocal.TheChief Justicedidnotexplain
his reasoning further; however, it is not entirely clear whether all those acting
deliberately as ‘human shields’ can be targeted. It has been suggested that civilians
acting voluntarily or involuntarily as ‘human shields’ should not be harmed, given
that their actions do not pose a direct risk to the opposing forces.134 Also, during the
SecondMeetingofExperts organizedby the ICRCandTMCAsserPress135 , voluntary
human shielding was a contentious issue.136 An interesting alternative to Barak’s
ﬁnding seems to be the compromise view presented during the meeting. This view
consists in qualifying voluntary shielding as direct participation depending on the
circumstances and subject to a proportionality test.137 Given that it is narrower than
Barak’s position, this approach seems to be more compliant with the protection
granted to civilians under international humanitarian law.138
2.3.3.3. The functional approach: a wide interpretation. The principle used by Chief
Justice Barak in identifying which of the above-mentioned activities constitute
‘direct participation in hostilities’ was the one proposed by Watkin139 as part of
his functional approach, namely whether civilians are performing the function of
combatants.140 In order to identify direct participation in hostilities, Watkin pro-
poses to ‘apply the basicmilitary staff structure (personnel, intelligence, operations,
Shields’,Guardian, 9 March 2007; BBCNews, ‘Israeli Army “Used Human Shields”’, 8 March 2007; BBCNews,
‘Israelis Accused of “Human Shields” Tactic’, 25 July 2006. See also R. Otto, ‘Neighbours as Human Shields?
The Israel Defense Forces’ “Early Warning Procedure” and International Humanitarian Law’, (2004) 86/856
International Review of the Red Cross 771.
133. Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, supra note 1, Opinion of Chief Justice Barak,
para. 36.
134. ‘Likeworkers inmunitions factories, civilians acting as human shields,whether voluntary or not, contribute
indirectlytothewarcapabilityofastate.Theiractionsdonotposeadirectrisktoopposingforces.Becausethey
are not directly engaged in hostilities against an adversary, they retain their civilian immunity from attack.
Theymay not be targeted, although amilitary objective protected by human shields remains open to attack,
subject to the attacking party’s obligations under IHL to weigh the potential harm to civilians against the
direct and concretemilitary advantage of any given attack, and to refrain from attack if civilian harmwould
appear excessive.’ Human RightsWatch, ‘International Humanitarian Law Issues in a PotentialWar in Iraq’,
brieﬁng paper, 20 February 2003, available at http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/arms/iraq0202003.htm#1.
Schmitt, however, considered that civilians –with the exception of children –who act voluntarily as human
shields unquestionably take a direct part in hostilities. See M. Schmitt, ‘Humanitarian Law and Direct
Participation in Hostilities by Private Companies’, (2005) 5 Chicago Journal of International Law 511, at 541.
135. ICRC/TMCAsser Institute, ‘Second Expert Meeting’, supra note 113.
136. Ibid., at 6. However, it was agreed that ‘shielded’ objects remainmilitary objectives.
137. ‘In aerial warfare, for instance, civilians shielding military objectives with their presence constituted much
more of a legal obstacle for the attacker than an actual physical defense. Therefore, such voluntary shielding
did not constitute DPH [Direct Participation in Hostilities] – but had to be weighed in the proportionality
test. In land warfare, on the other hand, voluntary shielding could become an actual physical obstacle to
military operations and would then have to be regarded as a defensive measure, which constituted DPH.’
Ibid., at 7.
138. Additional Protocol I, supra note 30, Art. 51(2); Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, supra note 66, Rule 1, at 3.
139. K. Watkin, ‘Combatants, Unprivileged Belligerents and Conﬂicts in the 21st Century’, Background Paper
prepared for the InformalHigh-LevelExportMeetingontheReafﬁrmationandDevelopmentof International
Humanitarian Law, Cambridge, 27–9 January 2003, at 17.
140. Ibid.
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logistics, civil–military relations, andsignals) toanon-stateorganization’.141 Accord-
ing to his view, ‘[w]hile this would be more challenging to apply during the early
developmentofanon-state identity,andthereforerequiresomeﬂexibility, itprovides
a structured basis for separating civilians and “combatants”’.142 Furthermore, ‘[a]n
advantage to using such a template is that it accounts for military planning as well
as the activities of the actual operational forces’.143
Suchanapproach, however, has several inherent problems.As the authorhimself
suggests, while this model allows the separation of political and military activities,
‘distinguishing between the two will remain difﬁcult when dealing with a non-
state organization or a government that has integratedmilitary command/political
structure’. Furthermore, it does not acknowledge the problem of unorganized or
sporadic civilian participation in hostilities.144 It is also not clear to what extent
both state and non-state parties to a conﬂict can be equated. This seems to depend
upon the level of organization, control, and specialization,145 which does not appear
to be considered as part of this model. Finally, a functional methodology does not
provide sufﬁcient protection to civilians, as it allows a wide range of people to be
targeted.
2.3.3.4. The requirement of a close link: a narrow interpretation. Chief Justice Barak did
not explicitly consider tobenecessary a close linkor correlationbetween the act per-
formed by civilians and the threat that it represents to the enemy. He stated that ‘[i]n
our opinion, the “direct” character of the part taken should not be narrowedmerely
to the person committing the physical act of attack’.146 The ICRC Commentary to
Article 43(2) of Additional Protocol I provides, however, that ‘[d]irect participation
in hostilities implies a direct causal relationship between the activity engaged in
and the harm done to the enemy at the time and the place where the activity takes
place’,147 and it covers ‘acts of war which are intended by their nature or their pur-
pose to hit speciﬁcally the personnel and the “mate´riel” of the armed forces of the
adverse Party’.148 The ICRC Commentary to Article 51(3) of Additional Protocol I
states that ‘“direct” participationmeans acts ofwarwhichby their nature or purpose
are likely to cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment of the enemy armed
forces’.149 Inaddition, theICRCCommentarytoArticle13(3)ofAdditionalProtocolII
provides that ‘[t]he term “direct part in hostilities” is taken fromCommonArticle 3,
where it was used for the ﬁrst time. It implies that there is a sufﬁcient causal
141. K. Watkin, ‘Humans in the Cross-Hairs: Targeting and Assassination in Contemporary Armed Conﬂict’, in
D. Wippman and M. Evangelista (eds.), New Wars, New Laws? Applying the Laws of War in the 21st-Century
Conﬂicts (2005), 137–79, at 153.
142. Ibid.
143. Ibid.
144. Melzer, supra note 40, at 435.
145. Ibid.
146. Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, supra note 1, Opinion of Chief Justice Barak,
para. 37.
147. Sandoz et al., supra note 122, at 516, para. 1679.
148. Ibid.
149. Ibid., at 619, para. 1944.
THE ISRAELI SUPREME COURT’S JUDGMENT ON TARGETED KILLING 209
relationship between the act of participation and its immediate consequences.’150
This commentary suggests that a very close correlation should exist between the act
performed by the civilian and the threat to the adverse party. Support for this stance
can be found in the Report of the Third Expert Meeting co-organized by the ICRC
and TMC Asser Institute, where experts appeared to agree that the identiﬁcation of
an act which constitutes ‘direct participation in hostilities’ requires ‘some degree
of causal relationship between the act and the ensuing harm to the adversary’.151
The prevailing opinion was that an act needed more than just a remote causal link
to harmful consequences. The difﬁculty, however, was that a ‘sufﬁcient’ causal link
could not be objectively measured.152
In this context, Cassese argues that civilians can only be targeted when they
carry arms openly before and during an armed action (Article 44 (3) of Additional
Protocol I).153 Otherwise, ‘belligerents would be authorized to shoot at any civilian,
on the mere suspicion of their being potential or actual unlawful combatants’.154
However, within the framework of the present conﬂict, he makes an allowance for
targeting a civilian, if he or she does not respond to summons:
It would seem that a proper way of accommodating the military and security require-
ments of Israel with the demands of international humanitarian law may consist in
requiring Israeli authorities, when they suspect that a civilian may carry on his or her
body explosives destined to blow up Israeli targets, to summons the civilian to show
that he or she is not carrying explosives. Only if the civilian refuses to comply,may the
military open ﬁre against him or her.155
This kind of approach constitutes a narrow interpretation of ‘direct participation in
hostilities’. It only allows the targetingof a civilianwhoposes an immediatemilitary
threat and when there is a direct causal link between the act and the harm for the
adversarial party.156
It is nonetheless questionable whether this approach is really practicable and
effective. It may be very difﬁcult for amilitary commander or soldiers to identify an
immediatemilitary threat. It is close to impossible to know, as amatter of certainty,
that a civilian has concealed explosives upon his/her person. There is an inevitable
elementof risk involved in suchcircumstances. This approachalso seems tobemore
adequate for situations involving unorganized civilians and not major operations
against organized armed groups.157 In addition, it does not offer practical guidelines
for situations where a civilian’s status is not immediately apparent.158
2.3.3.5. Will the narrow interpretation prevail in the end? Despite these lacks, the
interpretationof ‘direct participation inhostilities’ that requires a direct link ismore
150. Ibid., at 1453, para. 4787.
151. ICRC/TMCAsser Institute, ‘Third Expert Meeting’, supra note 113, at 28.
152. Ibid., at 34.
153. Cassese, supra note 87, at 8, para. 15.
154. Ibid. (emphasis in original).
155. Ibid., at 9, para. 16.
156. Melzer, supra note 40, at 432.
157. Ibid., at 433.
158. Ibid.
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compliant with the ICRC Commentary and Additional Protocol I. It permits some
assurance that those taking part in hostilities are effectively connected to them.
This is not the case for the approach adopted by the Chief Justice, which allows
the targeting of civilians whose behaviour is similar to that of the combatants,
without explicitly requiring a close correlation. The use of this approach could lead
to an absurd result where civilians acting in self-defence could be considered as
performing a combatant-like function and could be targeted. In addition, it could
also allow a wide margin of error, precisely what the narrow approach attempts to
avoid. Given the increasing civilian involvement in hostilities and the complexity
of modern armed conﬂict, the need to deﬁne the notion of ‘direct participation in
hostilities’ more speciﬁcally has never been more pressing. The application of this
vague rulewill become less equivocal once the ICRC releases theﬁnal interpretation
guidelines.
2.3.4. ‘For such time . . .’
Theconceptof ‘directparticipation inhostilities’ involvesa temporal elementwhich
regulates the period during which a civilian loses his or her protection. As stated
earlier, according to Article 51(3) of Additional Protocol I and Article 13(3) of Ad-
ditional Protocol II, civilians are immune from attack, ‘unless and for such time as’
they participate directly in hostilities. Nonetheless, they can regain their immunity
as soon as they disengage from the hostilities. The exact meaning of the expression
‘and for such time’ is unclear, and it is not deﬁned in international humanitarian
law. The ICRC Commentary to Article 13(3) clariﬁes that once a civilian ‘no longer
presents any danger for the adversary, he may not be attacked; moreover, in case of
doubt regarding the status of an individual, he is presumed to be a civilian’.159 This
clariﬁcation is, however, vague and does not allow a precise identiﬁcation of the
duration of the loss of immunity from attack.
Chief Justice Barak acknowledged that there is no consensus in international lit-
erature regarding the scopeof thewording ‘and for such time’.Heconsidered that the
current legal situation could lead to a ‘revolvingdoor’ phenomenonofprotection,160
entailing that a civilian directly participating in hostilities would lose his/her pro-
tection from attack for the duration of a speciﬁc military operation, and would
regain it between military operations, regardless of how often and how regularly
they take a direct part in hostilities.161 In his view, this situation is to be avoided, as
it allows terrorists to carry out attacks and then quickly regain civilian status, when
they rest and plan further attacks. However, as pointed out during the Third Expert
Meeting, the ‘revolving door’ mechanism of civilian protection is inevitable162 and
is not a malfunction of international humanitarian law.163 The period of the loss of
protection corresponds to the period during which a civilian participates directly
159. Sandoz et al., supra note 122, at 1453, para. 4789.
160. Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, supra note 1, Opinion of Chief Justice Barak,
para. 40.
161. ICRC/TMCAsser Institute, ‘Second Expert Meeting’, supra note 113, at 22.
162. ICRC/TMCAsser Institute, ‘Third Expert Meeting’, supra note 113, at 59.
163. Melzer, supra note 40, at 442.
THE ISRAELI SUPREME COURT’S JUDGMENT ON TARGETED KILLING 211
in hostilities. More precisely, ‘the duration of loss of protection against direct attack
depend[s] directlyonthebeginningandendof “directparticipation inhostilities”’.164
As a result, this characteristic is an integral part of international humanitarian law.
In delineating the contours of the ‘for such time’ doctrine, Chief Justice Barak
again looked at two extreme situations. First, he established that ‘a civilian taking a
direct part in hostilities one single time, or sporadically, who later detaches himself
from that activity, is entitled to protection fromattack’.165 That personwould not be
attacked for hostilities that he or she committed in the past. Second, he considered
that
[A] civilian who has joined a terrorist organization which has become his ‘home’, and
in the frameworkofhis role in that organizationhe commits a chainof hostilities,with
short periods of rest between them, loses his immunity from attack ‘for such time’ as
he is committing the chain of acts. Indeed, regarding such a civilian, the rest between
hostilities is nothing other than preparation for the next hostility.166
He found that, between the two extreme examples presented, there is a ‘grey zone’,
which has not been satisfactorily addressed by customary international law. There
was no further examination of the content of either one of these extreme situations,
and the judgment focuses (due to the nature of the question before the Court) on
only one end of the spectrum, namely on the situation of civilianswho aremembers
of a terrorist organization and who are continuously engaged in combatant-like
activities directed against civilians.167
Furthermore, as part of this reasoning, Barak seems to have resorted to two of the
approaches to the temporal element of ‘direct participation in hostilities’ discussed
during the Third Expert Meeting. There, three possible doctrines were considered,
namely the ‘SpeciﬁcActs Approach’, the ‘AfﬁrmativeDisengagement Approach’ and
the ‘Membership Approach’.168 Pursuant to the ‘Speciﬁc Acts Approach’, the loss of
civilian protection against direct attack lasts as long as the speciﬁc acts amounting
to direct participation in hostilities. According to the ‘Afﬁrmative Disengagement
Approach’, the loss of protection occurs when the ﬁrst act amounting to ‘direct
participation in hostilities’ is perpetrated and it lasts until the civilian disengages
in a manner objectively recognizable to the adversary. The ‘Membership Approach’
combines both of these approaches: the ‘Afﬁrmative Disengagement Approach’ is
applied to members of armed groups, whereas the ‘Speciﬁc Acts Approach’ applies
to unorganized civilians.169 During the meeting most experts agreed that this ap-
proach should be limited, so that it does not permit the targeting of all members of
an organized armed group.170 This could be achieved as part of a ‘Restricted Mem-
bership Approach’, which would only allow the attacking of an easily identiﬁable
164. ICRC/TMCAsser Institute, ‘Third Expert Meeting’, supra note 113, at 59.
165. Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, supra note 1, Opinion of Chief Justice Barak,
para. 39.
166. Ibid.
167. There is, however, a need to explore further the meaning of these notions. Fenrick, supra note 1, at 337–8.
168. ICRC/TMCAsser Institute, ‘Third Expert Meeting’, supra note 113, at 59.
169. Ibid.
170. Ibid., at 64; Melzer, supra note 40, at 447.
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organized armed group and its ‘ﬁghting’members.171 It was argued that the ‘Restric-
ted Membership Approach’ would only be relevant in non-international conﬂicts,
given that armedgroupsunder a command responsible to aparty to an international
armed conﬂict could fulﬁl the requirements of privileged combatancy, and groups
conducting hostilities on their own behalf would become independent parties to a
separate non-international armed conﬂict.172
It appears that, in the ﬁrst extreme examplementioned, Chief Justice Barak relied
on a version of the ‘SpeciﬁcActs Approach’, which has its advantages and disadvant-
ages. Experts have criticized it for allowing civilians to abuse the ‘revolving door’ of
protection and for rendering the operation of armed forces virtually impossible.173
Furthermore, it was also found that it would only be practicable in a limited array
of situations where civilians attacked the armed forces directly, without being part
of an organized armed group.174 However, it can also be argued that this approach
avoids mistaken or arbitrary targeting of civilians to the greatest extent possible,
while limiting the abuse of the ‘revolving door’ phenomenon by unorganized civil-
ianswhotakedirectpart inhostilities sporadicallyanddonotconstituteasigniﬁcant
military threat.175
Subsequently, in the second extreme example presented, Barak relied on the
‘AfﬁrmativeDisengagementApproach’. He considered in that example that the time
between hostilities constitutes preparation for the next hostility. This seems to
entail that in order to regain civilian status, the person concerned would have to
disengage unambiguously from the group. Such a reasoning incorporates the dif-
ﬁculties inherent in the application of the ‘Afﬁrmative Disengagement Approach’.
First, the second example provided by the Court is ambiguous and difﬁcult to apply
in practice. Second, during the Third Expert Meeting it was questioned whether in-
dividuals can afﬁrmatively disengage andwhether this requires a positive action.176
If the individual declaration of ‘afﬁrmative disengagement’ were to be adopted,
the approach would not be practicable in situations where thousands of civilians
were involved in hostilities.177 Third, as rightly observed during the same meeting,
civilians may choose not to disengage openly, fearing reprisals from the formerly
supported group.178 It should be emphasized that the ‘Afﬁrmative Disengagement
Approach’ was not the approach preferred by most experts attending the meeting.
Hence the reliance on this doctrine in the last example is problematic and it is not
representative of the current trend in the interpretation of the expression ‘for such
time’. It is, however, important to note that Barak distinguished between two dif-
ferent cases and that he did not rely exclusively on the ‘Afﬁrmative Disengagement
Approach’.
171. ICRC/TMCAsser Institute, ‘Third Expert Meeting’, supra note 113, at 64.
172. Melzer, supra note 40, at 446.
173. ICRC/TMCAsser Institute, ‘Third Expert Meeting’, supra note 113, at 60.
174. Ibid.; see also Melzer, supra note 40, at 443.
175. Melzer, supra note 40, at 443.
176. ICRC/TMCAsser Institute, ‘Third Expert Meeting’, supra note 113, at 62.
177. Ibid.
178. Ibid.
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In spite of this, the Court should have relied on the ‘Limited Membership Ap-
proach’, which – as we would submit – could apply to situations of international
armed conﬂict where an armed group does not qualify for combatant status.179 It is
not certainwhich approach the Court will use in future cases. Perhaps it will follow
the practice initiated by Barak, which consists in proceeding on a case-by-case basis
and according to the circumstances speciﬁc to each situation.
2.3.5. Proportionality
2.3.5.1. Requirements to be fulﬁlled prior to and following a targeted killing. A funda-
mental development ﬂowing from the decision is the requirement that the fol-
lowing principles be respected in each case where a targeted killing is envisaged:
(i) ‘well based information is needed before categorizing a civilian as falling into one
of the discussed categories’; (ii) ‘a civilian taking a direct part in hostilities cannot
be attacked at such time as he is doing so, if a less harmful means can be employed’;
(iii) ‘after an attack on a civilian suspected of taking an active part, at such time, in
hostilities, a thorough investigation regarding the precision of the identiﬁcation of
the target and the circumstances of the attack upon him is to be performed (retro-
actively)’; and (iv) ‘if the harm is not only to a civilian directly participating in the
hostilities, rather also to innocent civilians nearby, the harm to them is collateral
damage. That damagemust withstand the proportionality test’.180
These requirements provide an important safety net that serves to ensure that
all targeted attacks are carried out cautiously and with the smallest margin of
error possible. They also limit the discretion granted to the state and represent a
considerable improvement in the situation of innocent civilians. They require that
other less harmful means be exhausted prior to a targeted killing. Furthermore,
they render the state accountable for its actions by requiring an investigation. The
room formanoeuvre is also restricted by the fact that the harm to innocent civilians
must be proportional to themilitary advantage gained from the attack.While these
requirements are broad and difﬁcult to implement in practice, they undoubtedly
represent an important and unprecedented development in limiting the legality of
targeted killing.181 Also, although the judgment focuses on state responsibility, it is
possible, according to Cassese, that these requirements could be used in the future
to prosecute individuals for targeted killing.182
179. This viewwas also submitted by an expert during the Third Expert Meeting, ibid., at 58.
180. Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, supra note 1, Opinion of Chief Justice Barak,
para. 40. It has been rightly suggested that the requirement of ex ante and ex post examinations, used within
the framework of direct participation in hostilities by Barak, should a fortiori also apply to innocent civilians.
See Cohen and Shany, supra note 1, at 317–18.
181. Several authors have welcomed this improvement and have found these requirements useful and helpful.
Cassese, supra note 1, at 339; Fenrick, supra note 1, at 332, 337, 343–5; Cohen and Shany, supra note 1, at 310,
317–18.
182. Cassese observed that the rules of international humanitarian law on the conduct of hostilities, ‘which only
minimally regulate states’ conduct and in effect serve only to prevent extreme cases, may not be amenable
to serving as parameters for an assessment of the criminality of the conduct of individual combatants. In
other words, those rules may serve for the purpose of establishing state responsibility in the most glaring
instances of their violation, butmaynot serve as criminal rules: criminalization of conduct contrary to those
rulesmight be contrary to the principle of speciﬁcity prevailing in international criminal law.’ Cassese, supra
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2.3.5.2. The interpretation of proportionality. Following this statement of limitations,
Barak evaluated the content of the last principle – the principle of proportionality.
TheChief Justice set a confused tone in this part of the opinionby announcing at the
outset that the principle of proportionality ‘is part of our legal conceptualization of
human rights’.183 However, he evaluated, in effect, the principle of proportionality
as enshrined in international humanitarian law. This confusion may be one of
the consequences of the phenomenon of fragmentation prevalent in international
law.184
The principle of proportionality as enshrined in international humanitarian law
is subject to intense debate, and its speciﬁc meaning is unclear. As a consequence,
Barak’s analysis of the principle was sketchy and general. However, it can be argued
that he should have taken into greater account the requirements mentioned in the
ICRC Commentary.
The principle of proportionality is applicable in international and non-
international conﬂicts. The general rule is formulated as a matter of customary
law, and various applications of it are made in conventional law.185 Referring to
the relevant provisions, Barak clariﬁed that civilians could be harmed if they are
present inside amilitary target,when they live orwork in or pass bymilitary targets,
and even if they are far from them.186 In all these cases, the harm to the innocent
civiliansmust fulﬁl the requirements of the principle of proportionality. Otherwise,
a legitimate military target may not be attacked if civilian casualties would be dis-
proportionate to the concrete military advantage. It was further speciﬁed that the
principle of proportionality in international humanitarian law focuses on propor-
tionality senso strictu, namely the ‘requirement that there be a proper proportional
relationship between the military objective and civilian damage’,187 as provided in
Israeli constitutional law. His approach was therefore grounded in international
humanitarian law, but reinforced and informed by Israeli law.
note 1, at 341. He emphasized, however, that the judgment has narrowed down these very broad standards,
whichmay serve in the future ‘to turn some unclear international rules intoworkable standards of conduct,
and also to open the way to the possible prosecution of individuals (superiors and subordinates)’. Ibid., at
339. See also Cohen and Shany supra note 1, at 310, 317–20; Ben-Naftali, supra note 1 at 322, 328–31.
183. Ibid., para. 41.
184. See for further details Part II, Section 2.1.5.
185. The customary principle is enunciated in Rule 14 of the International Customary Law Study. It provides
that ‘[l]aunching an attack whichmay be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete
and directmilitary advantage anticipated, is prohibited.’ SeeHenckaerts andDoswald-Beck, supranote 66, at
46. In conventional law, Art. 51(5)(b) of Additional Protocol I prohibits ‘an attack whichmay be expected to
cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated’. Similarly,
Art. 57(a)(iii) of the same instrument provides that those who plan or decide upon an attack shall ‘refrain
from deciding to launch any attack whichmay be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated’. In addition, Art. 57(b) stipulates that ‘an attack shall be
cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that the objective is not a military one or is subject to special
protection or that the attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete
and direct military advantage anticipated’. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 30.
186. Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, supra note 1, Opinion of Chief Justice Barak,
para. 42.
187. Ibid., para. 44.
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Chief Justice Barak conceded that
[T]he laws of armed conﬂict include additional components, which are also an integral
part of the theoretical principle of proportionality in thewider sense. Thepossibility of
concentrating that law into the legal category towhich it belongs, while formulating a
comprehensive doctrine of proportionality, as is common in the internal law of many
states, shouldbe considered. That cannot be examined in the frameworkof thepetition
before us.188
Indeed, his analysis of the principle of proportionality did not carry the general
discussion further.
2.3.5.3. Examples. In Barak’s view, there are two clear-cut and extreme examples
which illustrate the application of this principle: (i) it is proportional to shoot at a
combatant or at a terrorist sniper shooting at civilians and soldiers from his porch,
even if as a result an innocent neighbour or bystander is harmed; and (ii) it is not
proportional to bomb a building from the air, if it is apparent that scores of residents
and bystanders will be harmed. In this last example, Chief Justice Barak seems to be
referring to the killing of Sheikh Salah Shehadeh, one of the founders of Hamas’s
Izzedine al-Qassem Brigades. On 22 July 2002, an Israeli F-16 dropped a 1-ton bomb
on Shehadeh’s house, thereby killing him and 16 others, of whom 15were civilians,
includingninechildren, Shehadeh’swife, and their child.189 It is estimated thatmore
than100otherswere injured in theattack.190 Apetitionrequesting theCourt toorder
a criminal investigation against the former IDF chief of general staff, Lieutenant-
General Dan Halutz, for his role in this operation was deferred until a judgment in
the case at hand is given.191 Following Barak’s reasoning, it appears that the Israel
Defense Forces will no longer be able to carry out this type of targeted killing, as
it will now constitute a war crime.192 The petition against Halutz is, however, still
pending and one can only speculate about its outcome.
Between the two extremes mentioned by Barak, there are hard cases and ‘one
must proceed case by case, while narrowing the area of disagreement’.193 As men-
tioned earlier, theChief Justice used this type of reasoning throughout the judgment
whenever he encountered a question as yet unsettled in international humanitarian
law. Given the ambiguity of the subject treated, this effort was remarkable and it
provided useful examples that effectively limit the legality of targeted killing. Non-
etheless, it remains that the judgment enunciatedverybroad restrictions anddidnot
further specify the criteria applicable in themargins between extreme and clear-cut
examples.
188. Ibid.
189. A. Meyerstein, ‘Case Study: The Israeli Strike Against Hamas Leader Salah Shehadeh’, Crimes ofWar Project,
22 September 2002, available at http://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-shehadeh.html.
190. See also Ben-Naftali, supra note 1, at 330.
191. Ibid., at 325 and 330; HC 8794/03 Hess. v. Chief of Military Staff. See also BBC News, ‘Israel’s Military Chief
Resigns’, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6269353.stm.
192. Ben-Naftali, supra note 1, at 330.
193. Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, supra note 1, Opinion of Chief Justice Barak,
para. 46.
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2.3.5.4. Further requirements according to the ICRC Commentary. A weakness in the
Chief Justice’s opinion becomes apparent when his reasoning is compared with
the standards set by the authoritative ICRC Commentary. The Commentary nar-
rows down the scope of the principle of proportionality, as it provides that ‘[t]here
is no implicit clause in the Conventions which would give priority to military
requirements’.194 The expression ‘concrete and direct’ is intended to show that the
military advantage should be substantial and relatively close, and that hardly per-
ceptible advantages or those that would only appear in the long term should be
disregarded.195 Whenever an attack could hit civilians incidentally, the following
criteria must be taken into account:
The danger incurred by the civilian population and civilian objects depends onvarious
factors: their location (possiblywithin or in the vicinity of amilitary objective), the ter-
rain (landslides, ﬂoods etc.), accuracy of theweapons used (greater or lesser dispersion,
depending on the trajectory, the range, the ammunition used etc.), weather conditions
(visibility,wind etc.), the speciﬁcnature of themilitary objectives concerned (ammuni-
tion depots, fuel reservoirs, main roads of military importance at or in the vicinity of
inhabited areas etc.), technical skill of the combatants (random dropping of bombs
when unable to hit the intended target).196
Finally, in complex cases without a clear-cut answer, ‘[t]he golden rule to be
followed . . . is . . . the duty to spare civilians and civilian objects in the conduct
of military operations.’197
2.3.5.5. Difﬁculties inherent in the process of interpretation. Although a certain criti-
cism of the Chief Justice’s reasoning seems to be justiﬁed, it must be emphasized
that there are many inherent difﬁculties in deﬁning the proportionality principle
more speciﬁcally. As accurately explained in the Final Report to the Prosecutor by
the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, ‘[i]t is much easier to formulate the principle of pro-
portionality in general terms than it is to apply it to a particular set of circumstances
because the comparison is often between unlike quantities and values’.198 The eval-
uation of proportionality is to some extent subjective, and ultimately it needs to be
based on the common sense and good faith ofmilitary commanders.199 There are no
set criteria to determine in a court as amatter of certainty that an attack is dispropor-
tionate. In fact, despite the considerations mentioned above, the principle provides
a fairly broadmargin of judgment tomilitary commanders.200 Barak probably inten-
ded to avoid placing limitations on state powers in a situationof continuous conﬂict
with no prospective end. Indeed, he clariﬁed in the section on the scope of judicial
review, stating that ‘[p]roportionality is not a standard of precision. At times there
194. Sandoz et al., supra note 123, at 683, para. 2206.
195. Ibid., at 684, para. 2209.
196. Ibid., at 684, para. 2212.
197. Ibid., at 684, para. 2215.
198. Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing
Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Press Release, 13 June 2000, available at
http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/nato061300.htm.
199. Sandoz et al., supra note 123, at 683–4, para. 2208.
200. Ibid., at 684, para. 2210.
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are a number ofways to fulﬁl its conditions. A zone of proportionality is created. It is
the borders of that zone that theCourt guards. The decisionwithin the borders is the
executivebranch’s decision’.201 Thus, although it couldhavebeenmore informedby
the requirements mentioned in the ICRC Commentary, the Court’s interpretation
falls within the acceptable ambit of international humanitarian law.
2.4. Ex post examination of the action
An important aspect of the decision lies in the deﬁnition of the Court’s role in
this case as well as in its perception of the separation of powers in this ﬁeld. In
cases concerning war powers or military issues, national courts often defer to the
decisions made by the executive. This has been the case of the US Supreme Court,
which for a long period refused to interfere in a wide range of executive decisions
relating to security issues. Although this period now seems to be drawing to an
end, there was a long-standing tradition of judicial deference among US judges.202
Fortunately, judicial deferencewas not the approach adopted byChief Justice Barak,
who determined that it was his duty to rule in this case.
The startingpoint of his reasoningwas theﬁnding thatmilitary commanders and
ofﬁcersposted inGazaand theWestBankwerepublic ofﬁcialswho fulﬁl their duties
under the law. Although judicial review preserves the existence of their discretion,
the Court can review the legality of the use of this discretion.203 The level of review
varies according to the questions raised. At one end of the spectrum – with the
highest standard of review – there are questions (such as the one in the present case)
relating to the content of international armed conﬂict law and the determination
of the applicable law.204 It is the Court’s duty to rule in such cases and to determ-
ine whether the executive has applied the law correctly. At the other end of the
spectrum–with the lowest standard of review– there are the decisions,made on the
basis of knowledgeof themilitaryprofession, toperformapreventive act that causes
the death of terrorists.205 According to Barak, these decisions belong to the executive
and the Court may only review whether a reasonable military commander would
have made such a decision.
In between these two extremes, there are intermediate situations. InChief Justice
Barak’s view, every situation requires a thorough examination, and ‘[t]o the extent
that it has a legal aspect, it approaches to one end of the spectrum. To the extent
that it has a professional military aspect, it approaches to the other end of the
spectrum’.206 He found that the question in the case at hand is a legal question and
that the Court has the expertise required to address it. Quoting a passage from the
decision Physicians for Human Rights, the Chief Justice reminded the Court that
201. Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, supra note 1, Opinion of Chief Justice Barak,
para. 58.
202. H. Keller andM. Forowicz, ‘A New Era for the Supreme Court afterHamdan v. Rumsfeld?’, (2007) 67 Zeitschrift
fu¨r ausla¨ndisches o¨ffentliches Recht und Vo¨lkerrecht 1.
203. Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, supra note 1, Opinion of Chief Justice Barak,
para. 56.
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The fact that the action is necessary from a military standpoint does not mean, from
the standpoint of the law, that it is legal. Indeed, we do not replace the discretion of the
military commander regarding the military considerations. That is his expertise. We
examine the result from the standpoint of humanitarian law. That is our expertise.207
Despite this, Chief Justice Barak warned that judicial review as performed by
the Court has its inherent limits. He noted that the level of judicial review of
military decisions is by nature low because it cannot be performed in advance (and
is performed retroactively). Furthermore, the main evaluation is conducted by the
examination committee and the review of the Court is ‘directed only against the
decisions of that committee, and only according to the accepted standards regarding
such review’.208
Although theChief Justice’s interpretationof the limitations imposedon targeted
killing could have been more stringent, his reasoning with regard to the scope of
judicial review should be commended for its courage, accuracy, and transparency.
Chief Justice Barak attributed to the Court a signiﬁcant role inmilitarymatters and
made the issueof targetedkilling ‘justiciable’. In this sense, the judgment constitutes
an important advancement for the safety of innocent civilians and an important
stumbling block for future decisions. Undoubtedly, more cases will be decided on
its basis, and that will further develop the limitations to targeted killing.
3. CONCLUSION
The Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel case is a judgment of
great quality, one that will go down in history and upon which numerous others
are bound to be based.With this landmark decision, Chief Justice Barak laid the last
stone of his ‘judicial monument’. In an extremely polarized political situation, he
took a brave and admirable stand on a controversial question. Barak used a careful
and balanced reasoning, in which he applied the relevant legislation and referred
to authoritative sources. He also resorted to innovative interpretation techniques to
adapt the legislation to changing circumstances. In many of the issues that he con-
sidered, the lawdoesnot offer concrete solutions.Most of the questions encountered
are subject to an intense debate in legal literature. Despite these complexities, the
methodappliedbyBarak in thecasewasveryopenand receptive.Thiswasespecially
apparent in the wide range of literature, decisions, and judgments on which the de-
cisionwas based. Most of the application of the legislation in this case appears to be
accurate. It also provides a fairly clear statement of the lawwhere it runs into a ‘grey
zone’. Thus thedecision is situatedwellwithin the acceptable ambit of international
humanitarian law and custom.
In addition, the judgment should be commended for the clariﬁcation and limit-
ation of the legality of targeted killing. While the Court initially refused to rule on
207. Physicians for Human Rights v. The Commander of IDF Forces in Gaza, HCJ 4764/04, 58(5) PD 385, 30 May 2004,
393.
208. Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, supra note 1, Opinion of Chief Justice Barak,
para. 59.
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this issue, it has now fully recognized its justiciability.209 The Court’s approach in
interpreting its own role and in assuming its duty to decide the case is admirable.
Numerousotherdomestic courts should followthis example. It isnowclearer for the
armed forces, organized armed groups, and innocent civilians which behaviour can
be subject to an attack. This improvement also translates into greater legal certainty.
Furthermore, certain types of targeting now ofﬁcially constitute war crimes, and
such limitations did not previously exist. Up to the time of this decision, carrying
out awide range of targeted killings seemed to be tolerated and allowed. Overall, the
decision represents a tremendous development in the ﬁeld of state responsibility
and, possibly, also in relation to criminal responsibility for targeted killing.210
Nonetheless, there are also numerous limitations and issues that require further
consideration with respect to the decision discussed. One of the greatest difﬁculties
of the reasoning lies in the fact that Chief Justice Barak did not pay further attention
to the application of the law of belligerent occupation. Situations in which the
Fourth Geneva Convention211 – as well as the rights enshrined therein – would be
applicable seem to fall outside the scope of the decision. It is also uncertainwhether
the entire Convention or only parts of it would apply to a particular situationwhere
targeted killing is contemplated.
In general, the judgment does not appear to contribute to the clariﬁcation of the
content of the law concerning ‘direct participation in hostilities’. Rather, it seems to
replicate the existing legal framework, together with its uncertainties. Chief Justice
Barak’s interpretation of the limitations imposed on the targeted killing of civilians
participating directly in hostilities was too broad and needs to be speciﬁed further
in future decisions as well as in international humanitarian law.
This improvement could be made in four concrete areas. First, the Chief Justice
adopted a wide interpretation of the ‘direct participation’ concept by applying the
functional approach versus the approach requiring a close link to a situation of
hostilities. It is this latter, narrower approach that is more appropriate to follow in
future cases. Second, in interpreting the requirement of ‘for such time’, Chief Justice
Barak used the ‘Afﬁrmative Disengagement Approach’ and a version of the ‘Speciﬁc
Acts Approach’, whereas the trend in international humanitarian law would have
commended resorting to the ‘Limited Membership Approach’. Third, his interpret-
ation of the concept of proportionality could have been more in tune with the
clariﬁcations of the ICRCCommentary. Finally, the four requirements stated, which
mustbe followed ineachcasebeforea targetedkilling is carriedout, arequitegeneral
and it is not exactly clear how they will apply in practice. Further steps should be
taken in order to ensure that they are respected and followed.
In analysing these requirements, Barak exclusively considered clear-cut cases and
hedidnot indicatewhichapproach shouldbe taken in themarginbetween.Apartial
reason for this is that on these issues international humanitarian law is unclear
209. This ﬁndingmayhavebeenprompted, amongothers, by the fact that the judgment couldhave repercussions
on the conduct of targeted-killing proceedings initiated abroad. See Cohen and Shany, supra note 1, at 319;
Ben-Naftali, supra note 1, at 325–6.
210. Section 2.3.5.1 supra, n. 182.
211. Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time ofWar, supra note 33.
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and provides no reliable judicial guidelines. However, the fact remains that Barak’s
reasoning left to Israelimilitarycommandersmajordiscretion in targeting terrorists.
On theonehand, given thatmilitary commandersneed tohave roomformanoeuvre
when taking such decisions, this is justiﬁed. They have more experience than the
judiciary in military affairs and it is their duty under the law to decide whether
such measures should be taken in cases of necessity. On the other hand, the broad
deﬁnitionof theseconditions isdangerous for thecivilianpopulation, sincegranting
an important discretion to the state increases the risk of arbitrary targeted killing.
The likelihood of injuring or killing persons other than the target is also greater in
those circumstances. It should be noted that the Palestinian territories are densely
populated, and that most operations can only take place within these territories.212
Furthermore, the generality and ambiguity of the requirements applicable in a case
of targeted killing can be interpreted to the advantage of those carrying them out,
or misinterpreted in a situation of emergency.
The most fundamental criticism that can be addressed to the Chief Justice’s
reasoning concerns his theoretical starting point: as a general rule, he considered
that the targeted killing of terrorists is legal.213 His reasoning does, in effect, seem to
acknowledge, albeit implicitly, thatapolicyof targetedkilling isacceptable.214 None-
theless, the targeted killing of civilianswho take a direct part in hostilities should be
treatedasan exception, andasa result theconceptof ‘directparticipation inhostilities’
should be construed narrowly for the beneﬁt of the innocent bystanders.215 Such
an interpretation is consistent with the presumption of protection of the civilian
populationenshrinedininternationalhumanitarianlaw.Thispresumptionrequires
that ‘[i]ncaseofdoubtwhetherapersonisacivilian, thatpersonshallbeconsideredto
be a civilian’.216 Civilians are protected from attack for such time as they do not take
a direct part in hostilities.217 During this time they beneﬁt from the presumption
and any measures affecting them should be adapted and interpreted in light of
this requirement. This is not merely an ideal of the lege ferenda; it is also ﬁrmly
entrenched in the existing framework of international humanitarian law. Hence,
during operations that represent a risk for civilians, the balance of interest should
shift in favour of the protection of the Palestinian population.218 The duty to protect
civilians should then outweigh the military advantage to be gained from a given
212. Ben-Naftali andMichaeli, supra note 8, at 291.
213. However, a different and interesting view has been recently formulated in relation to this question. Ben-
Naftali found that ‘the “inconclusive conclusion” of the Court is quite signiﬁcant: it appears that the Court
cannot determine whether the policy of targeted killings is permissible or impermissible. Appearances,
however, are notoriously deceptive: the Court neither outlawed the policy nor did it legitimize targeted
killings as a policy ab initio. It is quite possible that it attempted to preclude it from the ambit of Article 7 of
the ICC Statute, which requires the establishment of a governmental policy as an element of crimes against
humanity’ (emphasis in original); see Ben-Naftali, supra note 1, at 330.
214. If a targeted killing fulﬁls the criteria for ex ante and ex post veriﬁcation, then it can be considered as being
legal. These requirements are discussed in section 2.3.5.1 supra, at 213 et seq. See Public Committee Against
Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, supra note 1, Opinion of Chief Justice Barak, para. 40. For a similar line
of argument, see Fenrick, supra note 1, at 338.
215. Ibid., at 278–9.
216. Additional Protocol I, supra note 30, Art. 50(1).
217. Ibid., Arts. 51(2) and 51(3).
218. Ben-Naftali andMichaeli, supra note 8, at 278–9.
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operation. In this context, if the presumption was strictly followed, targeted killing
would constitute a rare exception, and the conditions imposed thereonwould need
tobestrictly interpreted.219 AlthoughtheCourtunder thepresidencyofChief Justice
Barak did not fully follow this pattern in the case, there is hope that targeted killing
will be limited further in future decisions and that instances where it is considered
a war crime will increase.
219. This should constitute an additional explicit limitation to targeted killing.
